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PREFACE 
The writer takes this opportunity to make a brief but 
sincere acknowledgment to Judge John J. Connelly, of the 
Boston Juvenile Court, and to Judge Leo H. Leary, of the 
South Boston MUnicipal Court, for their kindness and con-
sideration in permitting the use of available data, with-
out which it would have been impossible to have completed 
this particular study. 
It cannot be stated too clearly, however, that the 
selection of data, method of treatment, and conclusions 
drawn are the personal choice and opinions of the writer, 
for which he accepts sole responsibility. 
v 
CHAPl'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
A ffiW incidents occurring within a judicial district, all within a 
matter of months, delineate a serious and practical problem that is ever 
present in the daily work of correcting juvenile delinquency, teaching 
good citizenship and maintaining coDmunity standards. Because of the 
serious and fundamental implications involved, as will be recognized and 
discussed in this study, these incidents c~ot be lightly dismissed or 
ignored as normal experiences of no great importance. 
First there is a youth of sixteen years, with companions of his arm 
1 age, a few drinks of liquor or beer, an Wlprovoked assault with a dangerous
1 
weapon upon a police officer who happened, at the manent, not to be in un-
iform, an admission of guilt in the juvenile court, jurisdiction declined, 
an indictment by a Grand Jury, and the matter then placed on file in the 
Superior Court. Five months later, the same youth is arrested again tor 
another assault and battery. 
Another youth of sixteen, low grade intelligence and very shallow 
personality, already UDder a suspended order of cOlllllli tment to the Industri-~ 
al School, is one of a group of seven who terrorized a whole section with 
house and store breaks. .At'ter intensive police work he is arrested, to-
gather w:l. th his companions; he ad.mi ts eleven offences. The whole group 
is sent to the Grand Jury, is indicted in due course and, after trial, all 
h 
seven are placed on probation again and are back on the street corner. 1 
What about the suspended sentence? Since the superior, the higher, court I 
f 
1 
![ 
2 
has imposed a suspended sentence on its own account, it reasonably ranks 
that of the lower court and the latter might a.s well close its case,despite 
the wholesale and notorious violation ot its probationary agreement, so the 
lCM"er court does so close ita case. All this happened only a year ago, the 
youth has been arrested tour times since then and, at the moment, is aait-
II ing the Grand Jury again. Incidentally, three of the other six boys have 
been arrested again tor serious offences. 
!I Two other boys, sixteen and fourteen years of age, each under suspendll-
II ed orders ot cODI!d.tment to the Youth Service Board, are arrested again, and 
found to be delinquent again, in another municipal court. Their counselor, 
lj an office .. holding politic ian and liquor-dealer, advises them to appeal the 
findings and they do so. Can the tirat court now enforce the suspended or-
ders of commitment? Bo, that would not be legally sound a.s they may be 1 
found to be not delinquent in the Superior Court. Even it they are held to 
be delinquent in the higher court, the decision of the latter as to disposi-
tion will most aln.ys preclude any action by the lower court, regardless ot 
the inherent legal possibilities, as a matter of mere policy or good form II 
because any contrary action by the lower court would be, in effect, an over-
ruling of the higher court and that is not done by judges of sound discretion, 
regardless of how strongly they may feel about such a situation. 
What is the effect ot these experiences upon the boys, their compan .. 
ions, the neighborhood and the local court? A question inevitably arises 
whenever the subject is considered, namely, is our present method the best 
way to handle these matters? 
To appraise the situation, to identify the problem, in another light, 
consider a district court, or the juvenile court, with tra.ined personnel, 
modern techniques, religious, psychiatric and social work consul tents, sin• 
cere, intenaiw interest and wide and lengthy experience in a local area --
a boy, arrested for the fourth or fiftla time, who may have been caught fla.-
grantly in a seriously delinquent aot ... the boy, himself, or through a 
drunken or neglectful or abusive or grossly ignorant or stupid parent, ta-
ther or mother, or through a good, conscientious, unhappy and distracted 
or projectingly resentful ta.ther or mother, or through an attorney of good 
or poor reputation and ability, diseatisfied with any solution exoept his 
awn, m~q mutter "I appeal" and the local court; is immediately divested of' 
all authority and sta.tus, except the right to hold in sut't'icient bail to 
II 
insure appearance, and the whole matter is removed to another court, superi-
or in rank and authority, which has no juvenile department, as such, where 
it will be eventually considered, when enough similar cues have been aoou.m---
ulated to justify holding a juvenile session, and there the matter will be 
damined oanpletely de novo, as though nothing had previously been heard, 
determined or adjudicated. The end result, in the ooDmOnly held view of' 
lower court personnel, will more often than not contradict the lower court, 
vindicate the delinquent or, at most, impose mild restraint, returning the 
II 
I 
1, boy, already a poor citizen, in triumph to the looal community, an object o 
admiration and eDUlation to the less discerning of' the neighborhood delin-
1 
I quent and pre-delinquent children. 
It such a. sequence occurs too frequently it cannot tail to contuse 
the lCM'er court and the community, discourage serious effort, directly un-
dermine prestige with children and parents, diminish respect for law, pro-
mote delay, chance and personal favoritism, substitute uncertainty and lack 
of definite standards and encourage indifference and evasion of' responsibil-
3 
4 
ity on the part of both local courts and the police. On the other hand, J 
highly undesirable. 
Is this a fair statement of a problem known to exist, the subject ot 
thought and discussion by judges, probation ofticera, social workers,clergy, 
educators, politicians and CO!DJJI1n1 ties -- and by innocent victims and per- I 
sistent of'tenders? That is aaaething which uany in the field would like 
to know. It would seem to be well worth the ettort, interesting and profit-
able, to exaaU.ne the matter and to attempt to find accurate tactual answers 
and reasonable theoretical solutions to tbs questions that suggest themsel-
ves and that are posed herewith in the following section. 
ST .ATIDIENT OF PBOBLIK 
The basic question, the tundamental iaaue, has already been raised, 
that is, whether or not the current practice is the beat way of handliDg 
this appeal situation, with the divided and often oontlicting authorities 
involved. 
For the purpose of ample and adequate examination and in the hope ot 
extracting new tactual data, that may now or later contribute to the know- I 
ledge of the problem, it has been thought beat to break down or analyze the 
basic issue into the following subsections or questions, in part applied to 
a specific number of cases, each question requiring its own answer, and all 
contributing to the ultimate whole or overall answer. The objects of this I 
- -----=-== 
examination or study, therefore, may be posed as :f'ollt!Msa 
Court?" 
munity?" 
"What is the nature of' an appeal?" 
~t is the history of' appeals?" 
~t are the causes of' appeals?" 
~at is the frequency of' appeals?" 
nwhat were the previous records of' the appellants at time of' appeal? 
"What was the final diaposi tion of' these appeals in the Superior 
"What are the subsequent records of' the appellants?" 
"Does the present method of' handling appeals best serve the o~ 
II "Does the present method of handling appeals of':f'er adequate treat-
! ment to individual offenders?" 
-l 
"Does the present method of' handling appeals adversely influence 
Dl8thods, standards and achievements of' lower oourts?" 
"Should the present method of' handling appeals be changed?" 
•now could the present method of' handling appeals be changed?" 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
The writer had no idea, when the foregoing questions were first form-
ulated, that there was such deep and authoritative interest in the subject 
and, with others, had regretted that there was such a paucity of material on 
t he problem. A subject illdex, by Cabot, for example, does not even contain 
the word "appeal" although there are eighteen entries under the word "auth-
ority"; no one seemed to see any relaticm between the two words.l 
1 P.S.de Q.Cabot, Juvenile Delinquenoy,l946, 166 pp. 
5 
'• 
I 
When the preliminary search tor material got seriously under way, 
however, it became very evident that interest was not limited to the in-
quirer but that it had been, at one time or another, a burning, vital issue 
to the Judicial Council ot Jrfassaohusetts, to the Administrative Committee II 
of the Distriot Courts, to the :Massachusetts Child Council, to the National 
lol 
Probation and Parole Association and to such writers as Justice Lummus, 
Dean Pound, llr.Benediot s. Alper and others, as well as appearing frequent-
ly in Legislative oommittee hearings and reports. 
Speaking of the volume and increase "of the appeal business in the 
Superior Court," Justice Lummus saids 
Some person with a liking for statistics could find an interesting 
study in ascertaining what happened to all these appeal oases sent 
up to the superior court on appeal from sentences, which, if the 
lower courts are worth maintaining at all, mst be taken to have 
been at least presumptively correct and just.2 
The Jlassaohusetts Child Council, in stating "The Problem" writes: 
"In ninety-three per cent of the oases appealed to the Superior Court in 
one year, the findings of the lower courts were reversed, always with more 
lenient findings." 3 
The Nineteenth Report of the Judicial Council, 1943, reviewed its 
previous ten discussions of the subject in earlier reports and conoludedr 
"Practically every survey of criminal law administration in Massachusetts 
has agreed in condemning the present appeal system." 4 
What is said of adults and criminal appeals will apply, with equal 
force and truth to delinquency appeals, as will later appear. Jloreover, 
2 Henry T. Lummus, ~Failure ~~Appeal S_zstem, p.U. 
S The llassaohusetts Child Council, Legal Aspects 2!_ Juvenile ,E!!:. 
inqusnoy, p.2. 
4 Judicial Council of Hassaohusetts,Nineteenth Re ort,l943, .31. 
F=====~==================== 
6 
the present study will reveal the sobering thought that the delinquents in-
volved are usually the children of adults who have had personal. criminal 
experience with the court system and who are of the olaas discussed so un-
derstandingly by Justice Lummus.5 
:METHOD 
The first problem was to assemble enough oases to make a group sui'-
tieiently large to insure fair and reasonable answers to the questions 
posed. This also meant oases in which the significant material was avail-
able or could be secured. The period of time, 1938 to 1950, was necessary 
because it took that long for the Sutfolk Court to experience forty-eight 
appeals. The two cases from the Boston Juvenile Court served, not only to 
give a more convenient group total, tor statistical purposes. but also to 
slightly obscure the geographical background and to blur any possible case 
identifications. It was these considerations which determined the number 
of cases as fifty. The two Courts were selected beoense they were so well 
known to the investigator and. even more important, because they were the 
only two which could and would provide the necessary information, as the 
writer learned during another study three years earlier. 
First a list was drmm. up, consisting ot ell of these oases, an iden I 
tity concealment code was devised and used, the cards, papers, dockets and 
case histories were examined and the pertinent information was tabulated on 
large accounting sheets. 
The cases, taken in chronological order • were each examined as to 
age, hane, school, church, intelligence • court experience, offence, nature 
ot proceedings, presence or absence of parent, counsel, State represents.-
tive, psychiatric evaluation, finding, disposition and reasons tor appeal, 
tem, p.l5. 
7 
it known. All this material was factual with the exception at the appraial~ 
al of the hcmes, which were evaluated by the writer on the beais of known 
conditions, and whioh is further discussed 8lld explained in the body of the 
thesis. Then followed an inquiry covering the processes ot the Massachu-
setts Superior Court tor Suttolk Countylvith particular attention to the 
interval of pendency, nature of proceedings, presence or absence of counsel, 
finding, disposition Slld, if further probation, the eventual disposition. 
This exemination procedure followed a prepared schedule, a copy of which 
wi ll be tound. in the Appendix. 
When this much had been done, there was a recheck of records in the 
files of the Massachusetts Board of Probation with a view to determining 
the presence or absence of subsequent court records and, if there were such 
records, their nature and extent. 
While this work was being done, the writer attempted to validate the 
I 
inquiry or study by personally interviewing as many of the subjects as could 
readily be found after the intervening years, meeting them on the streets, 
in the otfi ce, in their heme a and some who sought him out to be of assistanc 
or to make appointments for their friends. Unfortunately, the scope of 
this special inquiry was too limited, because of the delicacy of the sub-
ject, the necessary explanations and the inevitable reminiscences, and cen-
tared almost wholly on the bald reeaons for the appeals, as further discus-
sed in Chapter V. The purpose of the tplique experiment was to learn £rem 
the boys, in their arm words, the motivations as they remembered, understood 
and, possibly, rationalized them; in other words, the appellants' own reasons 
for their appeals to a higher court. Parenthetically, it might be stated Jl 
that this validation process turned out to be a very happy experience; there 
8 
jl 
waa much friendliness, no unpleasant incidents, and the juvenile probation 
officer, the writer, was elated and encouraged to see that some of these 
boys, who could not have been called successes from the viewpoint of the 
local office, had done mch better than their prognoses of the time would 
have predicted. In instances where the individual concerned was not read-
ily available, because of loss of contact, absence from the community,death 
and so on, the ~ter baa supplied his own estimate of the motivation, in 
such oases stating clearly the circumstances on which it rests, usually sup-
ported by original written notes of the hearings, on file, and now used to 
refresh recollection. 
filed in the Appendix. 
A schedule showing dates and persona interviewed is 
When the assembling and tentative arrangement of material had been 
ca.mpleted, the writer was seriously troubled as to the scientific validity 
of some of the consequent inferences because of the short period of time 
that had elapsed since the more recent appeals. This possible objection 
was resolved by a .f'urther examination of all the appeal oases from the same 
Suffolk court from 1925 to 1938, a project that entailed the inapeotion and 
classification of 6,282 docket entries and which yielded another group ot 
eighty-five oases, with particular attention centered on the nature and ex-
tent of the subsequent juvenile and criminal records of those considered. 
This project also afforded an opportunity to reclassify the older figures 
and categories so as to bring them into contormi ty with the present system, 
thus establishing a valid, consistent basis for present and future compari-
sons and relative statistics, as set forth in Table I. The facts revealed 
by this subsidiary operation are recorded in Chapter VIII. 
Throughout the investigation, complete anonymity of the subjects was 
9 
preserved, of course, and a system of symbols was used to distinguish one 
case from another; anything less would hsve been a gross violation of the 
tenets of social wolk and an overt violation of the Massachusetts law. 
SCOPE 
This study is based upon the consideration of forty-eight appellants 
in the juvenile session of a district court which serves a community of ap- 1 
proximately 63,000 persons, a section of the City of Boston, together with 
two additional appellants from the Boston Juvenile Court. It is supported 
by an additional collection of eighty-five other oases, as noted supra. It 
was initiated with no pre-conceived conclusions but was intended to extract 
from the material such facts as might logically emerge in order that new 
light might be thrown on some of' the aspects of this constant situation. 
Sane study was also made of' adult appeal statistics and they may be 
cited, in appropriate circumstances, to offer a means of estimating the na-
ture and frequency of' the problem and to provide valid material for estab-
lishing comparable measurements and values. 
The nature, history and frequency of appeals were also considered at 
some length because it seemed logically desirable to present a well-rounded 
complete background in which to rest the principal fifty cases. 
Some knowledge of historical origins and developments in Massachu-
setts and other jurisdictions seemed to be an indispensable pre-requisite 
to a proper understanding of the subject, particularly if it should appear 
that remedies were suggested, and the inquiry was extended into those areas 
for that reason. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
Data has been gathered from books, pamphlets, reports, articles and 
10 
il 
bibliographies in the fields of social work and law, with particular empha-
sis on court tiles and records, statutes and official reports. The latter 
include reports of the Judicial Council of' Massachusetts, the Department of 
Correction, the Board of' Probation, the Administrative Committee ot the Dia-,1,1 
trict Courts and the various Special Commissions of' the Legislature f'rcm 
1916 to 1949, inclusive. The pamphlets of Justice Lummus, :tlr.Alper end of 
The Yassaohusetts Child Council were of' especial value. 
PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM 
The familiar literature, particularly the scw-ces mentioned and the 
reports ot Special Commissions of the Massachusetts Legislature, later to be 
examined, seems to be in e. quiescent period tor the past f'fiW years. With 
the exception of Dean Pound's observations in "The Juvenile Court in the 
Service State," published in 1949, 6 no new material has appeared to ths 
knowledge of the writer. This subject is tar from being quiescent, hem-
ever, because there still exists, in every day practice, this significant 
legal and social problem which so intimately affects the scope, f'unotion, 
power, program and morale of the lower courts. The oases cited on Pages 
1 and 2, supra, directly affecting twenty boys, occurred within the past 
year. 
As so often happens in this field, no one is particularly interested 
until some outrageous incident involves such boys in a public scandal and 
danger, whereupon the whole subject becomes a front page and editorial mat-
ter, with a clamor for scapegoats and radical changes. 
6 Roscoe W. Pound, "The Juvenile Court in the Service State," 
National Probation and Parole Association,Yearbook 1949, p.21. 
' 
II 
~ I 
OUTLINE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TEES IS 
Chapter II will describe the District and Superior Courts ot l4ass-
aohusetts. including juvenile courts and sessions. Chapter III will reaoh 
back into the origins. history and nature of appeals. a main section of the 
study. Chapter IV will consider the frequency ot appeals in order to estiJ 
mate the relative size of the problem. Chapter V will reveal the causes 
of appeals as the subjects themselves see them. Chapter VI will examine 
the principal group of fifty oases in the categories noted under "Method" 
supra. Chapter VII will follow the fifty oases into the Superior Court and 
note what happened to them there • with a ori tical evaluation of the nature 
and extent of reversals of previous decisions. Chapter VIII will note the 
subsequent records of the appellants • both the principal group of fifty and 
the collateral group ot eighty-five cases. Chapter IX will collect and set 
forth such conclusions as may emerge from the inquiry and Chapter X will of-
fer such reoaumendations. it any • as may be suggested by the previous chap-
ter. 
12 
CHAPl'ER II 
TBE DISTRICT .AND SUPERIOR COURTS OF :v.A.SSACHUSETTS 
Since an appeal, of the category with which this inquiry is concerned, 
always originates in a municipal or district court, that is, a lower court, 
and moves up to the superior, or higher, court, it might be well to describe 
as briefly as possible the history, nature, functions, powers, limitations 
and equipment of these courts as a matter of elementary information for 
those not already f~liar with the field. 
The roots of our present system are plainly discernible in the socio-
legal organization of England away back in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, as the facinating histories of Holdsworth, Plucknett and others 
depict the unfolding developments from the original commdngling of British, 
Roman, Saxon, Danish and Norman customs, manners and practices. When the 
early colonists crossed the ocean in 1620, 1630 and later they brought this 
11 ving and growing system with them. 
II From the earliest days of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, justices 
:I 
ot the peace functioned in criminal and civil matters, with limited jurisdic l 
tiona and powers, in the villages and towns, sanewhat similar to the posi-
tion they had occupied in England. Appeals from their decisions lay first 
to a county session of justices of the peace, later to county courts of com-
mon pleas, and, still later, to the State courts of common pleas, the pre-
decessor of our present Superior Court. Oddly enough, however, Boston had 
1 t a own local court and Suffolk County its own county court of common pleas. 
By 1858 the criminal authority of the local justices had been transferred to 
district courts and by 1877 their civil powers had been abrogated. 
13 
From this ancient. tightly loca.li~ed, almost self-governing judicial 
mechimi.am, the rapidly growing towns and cities of Massachusetts, through 
the Legislature, created their present district and municipal courts. By 
1874 ·suffolk County had acquired its contellq)orary organization of the Boa-
ton Municipal Court, the JIDlllicipal courts of South Boston, Roxbury, Dor-
chester, West Roxbury, Charlestown and Brighton and the district courts of 
East ~Boston and Chelsea. In 1906 the Boston Juvenile Court was establish-
ed, as a specialization of the Boston Municipal Court. There have been no 
jury ~rials in the lower courts since 1876. 
Our lower court system has expanded to the seventy-two district ancl 
municipal courts, not including Boston MUnicipal and Boston Juvenile Courts 
which novr constitute the "District Court of Massachusetts," according to 
the optimistic but apocryphal committee report published in the First Report 
or the Judicial Council in 1925. "Tod~ we are happy to report that there 
I 
are no longer seventy-two district courts in ~sachusetts but the 'Distric1 
Court of Massachusetts.•" 1 This enthusiastic designation, despite its 
exalted authority, even today could not bear intensive, detailed analysis 
but • even so • it is undoubtedly true that the ideal objeoti ve has been af-
firmed and progress is being made towards its realization by the unremitti~ 
efforts of the Administrative Committee of the District Courts. This com-
mittee, first created in 1922 with purely advisory powers and later conf'irm-
ed in increased authority and substantial control, has been making steady, 
if slow, progress against the debilitating influences of localism and blind 
conservatism. It must never be forgotten, however, that it is only the 
Legislature which can create courts and which can enlarge, reduce, elimi.I18.te 
0 
c_U_._192i ~~~onweal th of Ku aa.chusetts, First Report 2£ ~ Judicial ~-
14 
-
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I, 
I 
or reorganize them, with the constitutional exception of the Supreme Judi_ II 
cial Court. 
The jurisdiction and venue of the lower courts is based on geograph-
ical boundaries and on the punishments assigned to various violations of 
the criminal law, both factors delimited, determined and delineated by the 
Legislature. They can assume jurisdiction only of offences that were can-
mitted within their districts, although their processes may run throughout 
the Commonwealth. The major classifications of felony and misdemeanor are 
determined by the arbitrary line of degree of punishment and all offences 
that carry imprisonment for two and ons-hal1' years or more are felonies; 
all others are misdemeanors. The district courts have jurisdiction of 
all milldemeanors and of felonies that my be punished with less than five 
years of imprisonment, except libels and conspiracies. Their great ser-
vice, of course, is that they are the courts of first instance for the 
great majority of the citizenry, that they are open for business at all 
times, meaning every day except Sundays and legal holidays, and that they 
screen and divert the great mass of complaints from the Superior Court, 
which would otherwise become hopelessly involved in minor causes. Appeals 
from the dispositions of district courts, in all categories, lie to the 
Superior Court. The civil side of the lower courts, and the appeal system 
therein, is handled in an entirely different manner. 
Every district court today conducts juvenile sessions, supposedly 
in conformity with the paternal, non-criminalistic terminology of section 
2 fifty-three of Chapter 119, originally enacted in 1906. In the larger 
courts there are distinct juvenile departments. 
2 ~·~·~·• Ch.ll9, s.SS (1906). 
15 
In 1941, by Chapter 677 of the Acts of that year, a grouping of 
I 
to be shared ~~ courts was arranged whereby juvenile probation officers were 
in common, that is, the same officer would serve two or more of such courts 
In 1942 this plan was actually tried in Suffolk County, the West Roxbury an 
Brighton districts collaborating to that extent, but the arrangement was 
quietly dissolved in 1947, although the Report of the Board of Probation 
3 for that year says nothing of it. In 1947, by virtue of Chapter 655 of 
the Acts of that year, an extension of this plan was carried out in some 
other districts of the State but Suffolk County was exempted this time. 
These hesitant improvsments do not, however, reach to the core of the prob-
lam because they merely provide new workers, on a basis of personal selec-
tion, without professional training, and leave completely untouched the 
true issues, that is, specialized juvenile courts and a trained probation 
service and judiciary to conduct them. 
The quality of the work in the various districts is usually on a per 
sonalized basis, depending upon the sincerity, education, energy, interest 
I 
and aptitudes of the officers, whose efforts are wholly subject to the auth• 
ority of a judge who may or may not understand, accept or approve of the 
basic concepts of social work and specialized knowledge that have become 
professional assets of trained workers, with consequences as diversified 
as the personalities involved. Mr.Chute, executive director of the Na-
tion Probation and Parole Association, emphasized the requirements in this 
area when he recommended radical changes in the selection of judges as well 
3 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report 2£. ~Board 2£ Probation 
!2!. ~Years 1940-1947, p.3. 
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as probation officers.4 There are no transcripts of the proceedings or 
evidence which might be subject to a review by a higher court. 
Equipment usually consists of an office, desk, file and typewriter, 
with secretarial assistance still the exception rather than the rule, and 
the juvenile probation officer is expected to be a thorough and skilful in-
vestigator, historian, supervisor or teacher of the children who are being 
taught or "punishe~" manipulator of" environmental facilities, otfice con-
sultant, collllltUlity co-ordinator and his own secretary. When new oases 
come in groups, as they often do, most officers are fortunate if they can 
keep abreast of the new investigations that require priority of attention. 
It has become reasonably well settled policy in most district courts 
now to assign the juvenile work to <!lne particular judge, so that there may 
be consistency and continuity of interest, practice and supervision in this 
area. 
It is undoubtedly a fact that there has been a tremendous improvement 
in the quality of juvenile probation work in the lower courts within the 
past twenty years, as the writer has heard in many conferences and meetings 
of Massachusetts probation ot.rioers. It is true, however, that there are 
still too many one-man departments in Suffolk County courts, in startling 
contrast with the Boston Juvenile Court, with its six probation officers, 
secretaries, clerical assistants, volunteer workers and even a statistician 
and a nurse. It is also true that this court is the only one that main-
tains a specialized training or teaching program, the true goal of proba-
tionwork, but this activity, the Citizenship Training Group, is supported 
4 Charles L. Chute, "Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court," National 
Probation ao.d Parole Association Yearbook, ~· p.l. 
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by private, not State, funds. Judge Perkins» formerly of' that court, be-
lieved most strongly in this teaching f'unction. 5 
Strictly speaking, there is still only one juvenile court in this 
Commonwealth, the same Boston Juvenile Court that was established in 1906 
and that was to be extended as soon as the community could assimilate such 
a bold innovation. Despite the f'aot that it soon demonstrated its worth 
and possibilities and became nationally and favorably known, it still 
stands, not as an experimental outpost, to be sure, but merely as a soli tar 
bastion of' a new line that has yet to be formed. There have been nUlDSrous 
attempts to extend this court throughout the county, annexing the juvenile 
departments ot the other district or municipal courts, but they have repeat-
edly failed. In 1951, indeed, the matter died in the Legislative commit-
tee when the proponents revealed themselves to be unusually inept and unin-
formed while the increasing strength and confidence ot the other courts was 
never more forcefully presented and sustained. The wr1 ter, however, f'el t 
that the basic issues were never really joined and tbat nothing fundamental 
was really decided. It cannot be denied, it must be adndtted, that vested 
localism carried the day and the prospects f'or a united county juvenile 
court were considerably dimmed. It it is true that the district juvenile 
services have improved to the extent that they have reached the established 
level of the Boston Juvenile Court, as boldly asserted at the 1951 Legisla-
tive hearing, and that most certainly is not a conclusive fact, it still 
does not touch on the central problem, namely, must there be nine different 
courts, with nine or more different part-time juvenile judges, who are also 
5 John F.Perld.ns, Common Sense~~ Boys, p.37. 
criminal judges, to do the work of one community court that could contine 
itself exclusively to this specialized area of legal social work, wholly 
divorced from the adult criminal practices and methods which are the pri-
mary concern of the other district courts? This remains a project for 
the tuture. 
Incidentally, as far back as 1934, the Judicial Council of ~sachu-
1' 
I! setts, in its Tenth Report, 6 recommended that all the municipal and distric 11 
courts ot Suffolk County be organized into one county court, as an exten- j 
sion and amplification of the Boston Municipal Court, w1 th full-time judges 
to replace the present part-time and special judges in the smaller courts" 
but, although the subject comes up from time to time, nothing has ever been 
done about it. II 
The constitutionality ot lower court proceedings has been clearly es-
tablished and is no longer open to question.7 Its legal validity,however, 
rests solidly upon the right to appeal and the two matters are inseparable, 
a fact that cannot be slighted nor lost sight of when any study is made of 
the present appeal system. 
The Administrative Committee of the District Courts has put itself 
most strongly on record as favoring a social, non-legal approach in the 
conduct of juvenile hearings 8 and its pamphlet on the subject,cited below, 
6 Commomrealth ot Kassachuaetta, Tenth Report 2!_ ~ Judicial~­
.2!,!,1934, p.l5. 
1 -~-----------' First Report 2!_ ~ Judicial ~­
cil,l925, p.26. 
I 
8 The Administrative Committee of the District Courts, The Juvenile . 
~~District Court, p.33. 
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makes interesting reading. As a practical matter, however, it must have 
represented principally the views ot the Committee as it was then consti-
tuted in 1941 because it is not a standard manual ot procedure and most 
judges will not proceed in the suggested manner, rather preferring to con-
duct strictly .fair, impartial and thorough little adult trials, with mi-
nutely searching cross-examinations, technical pleas, dilatory tactics and 
all the o.f.fensi ve and dd.fensi ve maneuvers o.f the courtroom. It may well I 
be that such cautious conservatism is well .founded because several distric 
courts received humiliating notoriety during the past two years because 
some one was careless, uninformed or arbitrary about technical details in 
oases concerning children and .family matters. 
Before leaving the district courts, it is understood that the reader 
knows that all offences committed by boys or girls, between the ages o.f 
seven and seventeen years, are delinquencies, except the crime of murder. 
All these mtte rs are .first heard in the lower courts, with the possible 
exception ot murder, which might conceivably be initiated in the superior 
court. Despite the drastic changes of 1948, the presiding judge may still 
dismiss the delinquency charge and order a straight, criminal complaint it 
he thinks the circumstances warrant it, provided that the children are be-
tween the ages of .fourteen and seventeen years; such children are known as 
juvenile o.f.fenders. It is still possible, therefore, to have criminal 
oases in the lower courts and, indeed, should the charge be mrder, a seven 
year old child may still be classified as a criminal in our Commomrealth. 
Appeals, .from either the finding or the disposition, mean that the I 
matter is illlllSdiately transferred to the superior court but the lower court
1 
may still, if' it wishes, hold the child in bail and thus determine the 
iuue of custody on a financial or economic basis, impecunious children 
thus being subjected to the possibilities of jail or detention home. 
Our present Superior Court of Massachusetts finally emerged, in 1859 
from the older county courts of common pleas, atter a long, interesting 
evolvement from 1639 when the Puritan commonwealth first established a regu· 
lar system of courts of justice. By that date, 1959, we had achieved our 
now familiar three tier arrangement, that is, the interior or lower courts, 
an intermediate or superior court end the ultimate or supreme court of last 
resort. By that time, too, appeals could no longer lie from the superior 
to the supreme court on matters of fact but only on matters of lm. 
Today the Superior Court consists of one chief justice and thirty-
one associate justices and has exclusive, concurrent and appellate civil 
jurisdiction, as set out in the statutes.9 What is of most interest for 
the purposes of this study, however, is that it has original jurisdiction 
of all crimes and appellate jurisdiction of crimes tried before a district 
court or a trial justice and that it is a court of original and general 
jurisdiction possessing the inherent powers of smh a court under the com-
mon lmr, unless expressly limited, as well as those conferred by statutel.O 
The Court sits regularly each year in the fourteen counties of hhe State, 
as required by law. When sitting in Suffolk Cotmty for criminal business, 
its sittiDg is always single, not several, although conducted in sessions 
of varying number. This Court also is always open in every county except 
on Sundays and legal holidays, with certain qualifications in the matter ot 
those days. 
9 ~.G.~.,Ch.212, s.3,4,5. 
10 ~·5!.·~· ,Ch.212, s.6. 
21 
i 
There are three types of cases that conoem the mdern Superior 
Court and those are appeals from judgments in the district courts,including 
juvenile appeals; defendants bound over to the grand jury by district 
courts; end defendants indicted by the grand jury prior to arrest and so 
never appeariDg in a.rry district court. In speaking of the congestion in 
this Court, the Judicial Council attributed it to the changed nature of its 
duties, from those originally assigned to it, and to the lead of appeals 
from the lower eourbs. At that time, 1925, the volume of appeals from the 
II lOI'ler courts was seriously threateniDg the whole program and organization 
1 of the higher court.11 In 1928 adult and juvenile appeals constituted 
1 61.6 per cent of its total docket but by 1946 the total had dropped to 
46.9 per cent, but the latter is still a very substantial figure. 
Is there a juvenile court of superior status or a juvenile department 
of the Superior Court'/ No, there is not, even though forty-five years have 
passed since the first delinquency Act was placed on the statute books. 
22 
Appeal oases come in from the lower courts and are allowed to aooumu-J 
late until it is believed that there are enough to justify holding a juve-
II 
II 
nile session. At that time, sane judge, usually the one who happens to be 
sitting in the criminal session, receives the assigmnent and holds his court 
in a small room, a replica of the adult courtroom across the hall. There is 
no continuity of or specialization by judges here and there are no juvenile 
probation officers among the fourteen officers of the Suffolk branch of the 
Superior Court. As in the lower courts, the probation officers are selected 
11 Commonwealth of l4assaohusetts, First Report 2£ ~Judicial~-
2.!,!. 1926, p.l3. 
12 , Statistical Reports 2!_ ~ Corm:nis-
sioner ~ Correction, 1947-1948, p.147. 
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on a personal basis, such appointments being considered a perogative of the 
chief justice, and there are no examinations although there is a selection 
co~ttee which interviews candidates; the recommendations of the committee 
are not always accepted or approved. The judges are appointed by the Go~ 
ernor for life, on good behavior, as in the district courts. The clerks. 
however, are elected of:t'icials, as is the district attorney, and their of-
fices are staffed by their personal appointees. There are no elected or-
ficials in the lower courts. 
Before the Superior Court considers an appeal, a probation officer 
in whose geographical district the appellant lives, receives an assignment 
of the case and presumably visits the home. talks with the child and the 
family and examines the report from the lower court, if such a report; is 
available; possibly he talks with a probation officer from such court; from 
these experiences he prepares a report of bis own, possibly with recommend&-
tians. On the basis of this first-hand knowledge, is he then available for 
consultation at the hearing? No; another officer, regularly assigned to t J 
session, takes the papers and represents the probation department at the hear-
ing. This second probation officer has studisd the report, together with , , 
clergyman and a representative of the office of the district attorney, whose 1 
influence and power is still very strong. Although none or these parties 
has seen the child, his family or his home, they arrive at some conclusions 
which are presented to the Court. What statute provides for chaplains at 
the Court;? None, but it has become a recent custom, used with the consent 
ot those concerned. 
Does this procedure differ very much from that found by Alper in 
1956? The foregoing had been prepared before the WTiter discovered Alper's 
I 
24 
article lS but a reading of it would seem to prove that writers come and go 
but that the Court placidly wends its routine way oblivious to such imperti-
nent observations. 
Our subsequent study will tell us of the interval of pendency before 
hearing, the nature of the hearings, the pleas, lack of pleas, dispositions 
and so on. 
The lack of juvenile probation officers has been recognized and at-
tested by the 1941 amendment to section fifty-eight of Chapter 119, viza 
If a child adjudged a wayward child or delinquent child is placed 
on probation by the superior court he may be placed in the care 
of a probation officer of the district court, including in such 
terms the Boston Juvenile Court, within the judicial district of 
which such child residea.l4 
but the writer has never heard of an instance wherein this procedure has 
yet been used in Suffolk County • including the Boston Juvenile Court. 
What does this chapter teach, what inferences may be justifiably 
drawn and what conclusions emerge? 
Although essentially a narrative to identity and place the relative 
posi tiona and values of the component elements of the local judicial struct 
ure, nevertheless the historical origins are of primary interest as indicat 
ing growth, the pragmatic development and the strength of current forms and 
methods, while they also emphasize to the disceming eye that there is noth 
ing really statio, necessarily fixed for all time, in our familiar modes 
and techniques, although it is made equally clear that changes come slowly 
and painfully, often long after their need has been seen. While possible 
lS Benedict S.Alper,"Juvenile Justice," Journal of Criminal Law and 
II 
Criminology, 28:366, September-Ootober,l937. - --
14 ~·~·~·· Ch.ll9, s.58 (Amended l94l,Ch.264,s.l). ' 
errors ot regression are indicated, there is also the inference that prog-
ress in the past suggests am encourages progress in the future, a chal-
lenge, in fact, to contemporaries to carry on the continuing development 
end growth ot the system. The thought of hanging an eleven year old 
child today is shocking end universally repugnant but once was a matter o£ 
fact end undoubtedly the defenders ot the status quo ot that era resented 
criticism and changes; our present concepts of summary, elementary disposi-
tions, w1 thout sufficient study and specialized techniques, without trained 
personnel, may be equally as incomprehensible to future generations. 
It must have been noted here that Boston end Suffolk _Cou:nty, even 
tram earliest times, disassociated themselves more or less from the rest 
ot the Conmo:nwealth and seemingly were permitted to do so, a condition that 
continues down to the present d~. 
It has also been noted that juvenile delinquency is a daily concern 
in the district courts, with a policy of continuity of judges, specializa-
tion of selected probation officers, without the contingent embarrassments 
and obligations that go with elected personnel, and that direct, personal 
knowledge is the basis of judgments determined, often assisted by social 
agencies and professional consultants. On the other hand, juveniles are 
only of occasional, periodic concern in the superior court, the judges are 
assigned by chance or turn, there are no juvemle probation officers, per 
se, the judgments are largely based on hears~, impersonal knowledge and 
the complications inherent in elected personnel are always a factor. The 
pendency intervals, a very important tact or, will be considered separately 
in a later chapter. Each court organization is equally deficient in a 
selective and training program for personnel but it is generally conceded 
li 
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tod~, by in!'ormed observers, that the achievement level of the lower court~ 
has shown a decided improvement in the past two decades. Such widely dit- I 
ferent authorities as the Administrative Committee and Alper in!'onn us that 
the Superior Court has not been intensively interested in the juvenile as-
pect ot its work, the latter evidently being dwarfed by the importance and 
volume of other matters. 
We find that the Boston Juvenile Court is unusually well equipped 
and generously staffed, in contradistinction to the district juvenile de-
part:aents, but, even there, appointments are a personal perogative ot the 
judge. Nowhere in Massachusetts is there a pre-employment examination such 
as is commonly used in New York City. As a matter of faot, there is not, 
at the moment, one academically, professionally trained probation officer 
in Suffolk County; all have received their training and experience on the 
job. It has also been noted that judges, although they are the directors 
of juvenile programs in the courts, need show no special interest nor apti-
tude for this specialized area of the law. What has all this to do with 
appeals? A great deal, indeed, tor so long as our so-called practical, 
rule-of-thumb methods obtain persons may be justified in shopping around 
for a forum that impresses them as being final and authoritative. 
Finally, most students of the system, who are not personally involve~! , 
I 
believe that a unified, professional, oounty-wide juvenile court, specializJ 
ing in this field alone, is still eminently desirable and a valid objective 
for future pro~ress. 
·-
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CHAPTER III 
THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF APPEALS 
To one trained in Massachusetts law 8lld viewpoint, it is axiomatic 
that appeals lie .from the district to the superior court because it is only 
in the higher court that one may be tried by a jury of his peers. The 
point seems to have been definitely settled as long ago as 1647, although 
there had been a brie.f' unsettled period from 1630 to 1641.1 There is no 
doubt today that every criminal case be.f'ore the Superior Court DD.lst be 
tried before a jury, unless there is no issue o.f' fact, as provided by sec-
tion two of Chapter 278. On pleas o.f' guilty, of course, there are no issues 
of fact to be decided. That same section of Chapter 278 was amended by 
Chapter 185 of the Acts o.f' 1929, which reiterated a. principle o.f' 1643, in 
order to make it clear that a defendant may be tried before a judge, with-
out a jury, but only whsn the defendant has requested it. There are no 
special provisions to cover delinquents in these basic statutes. 
It is commonly asserted in courthouse corridors that the right of 
appeal is a constitutional right but that is a loose, careless expression 
which really means that there exists a constitutional right to a jury trial, 
which may be secured by an appeal. Since t he adoption of the Conati tution 
the authority haa been lodged in Article XII and Article XV of "The Declar-
ation of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" 
and there seems to have been no serious challenge since that time to the 
1 Felix Frankf'urter and Thomas G. Corcoran, "Petty Federal Offenses 
and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury," Harvard ~ Review, 
39:940, June, 1926. 
-
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principles therein established. Legal scholars will point out, however, ~ 
that this guaranty of' a jury trial extends only to "capital or infamous 
crimes" and not to misdemeanors. There are i'orty-one comments or inter-
pretations in the notes following Article XII, including special references 
to neglected children, the insane and thirty-nine other categories, but de-
linquent children are not mentioned at any time.2 Practically speaking, 
however, it is generally accepted that delinquent children also have a con-
sti tutional right to a jury trial and that working principle will undoubt-
edly stand unless the Supreme Judicial Court should decide otherwise. 
When appeals and rights of jury trial are mentioned someone invari-
ably mentions Magna Carta or the early chancellors of England. The opinioJ 
widely held, that our 8 modern instituticn of trial by jury derives f'rom Mag 
na Carta" is one of the most revered of' legal fables, as Frankfurter and 11 
Corcoran characterize it.3 From the time of' Henry V, in 1414, petty of-
fenders were tried without juries and the practice continued to grow, not 
through royal tyranny but by legislative enactment until., by 1776, a lead-
ing practice book devoted two thousand pages to the offences triable by 
this procedure and,. in most instances, the verdicts were not subject to ap-
peal. "Thus drastically limited does the right of' trial by jury seem to 
have been known to Englishmen for two centuries preceding the separation 
4 
of' the colonies, n say the same authors. The equally fallacious idea 
that the chancellor busied himself' with criminal matters also continues to 
persist but Plucknett asserts that chancery was essentially a civil organ-
2 Annotated ~ ~ :Massachusetts, Volume X, pp.29-34. 
3 Frank:t'urter and Corcoran, ~·~·, p.922. 
4 ~·· p.933. 
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ism, not a criminal body, end it eventually became a revenue court. 5 II 
The English picked up the idea or moving up from one court to anoth-
er, the same Plucknett sa:ys, as "the hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts --
archdeacon, bishop, archbishop, pope -- gave English layers their first 
sight of appeals being carried from court to court." Within the limits of' 
1 their own system they copi4d it, "at least in externals." Braoton de- II 
scribed this system but it was used only in civil, not criminal, procedure. 6 
!I This common knowledge and experience with the origin and praotioal i 
I 
II 
development of jury trials and rights of appeal crossed the ocean with the 
early settlers along the whole Atlantic seaboard. Very soon, however, Mass 
achuiletts, motivated by "the Puritan's characteristic jealousy o£ the magis-
trate," sa:ys Dean Pound, adopted its policy, as of 1641, noted supra, while 
New York held to the original view. 7 Massachusetts influenced the other I 
New England colonies while New York was followed by New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina. What difference does it make now? 
The cleavage has persisted to the present day and we must understand it when 
we compare our juvenile law and practice with that of other States. This 
is a jurisdiction in wbioh the right to appeal for a jury trial exists as 
"a right under the Constitution," as af'f'inood in 8 Gray 329 at 341, 1857, 
108 Mass.5, 1871, 132 Mass.354, 1882, and re-emphasized in 253 Mass.244, 
1925, the Sylvester oase, a landmark in our juvenile law. We should know, 
however, that local principles, legal and social, are not necessarily those 
or other jurisdictions of the English-speaking world. 
5 Theodore F.T.Plucknett, A Concise History 2!_ ~ COIIDDOn ~,p.l46. 
6 .ill!• 1 p.345e 
7 Roscoe Pound, ~Spirit 2!:, ~ Common~, p.55. 
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It might be well to recall at this point, also, that, although the 
Puritans might or might not have been jealous of authority, it was no simple 
matter to appeal in colonial times. Right up to the framing of the Federal 
Constitution, Yassaohusetts still insisted that its appellants recognize 
with sureties, maintain good behavior while awaiting trial, take their ap-
peal at time of sentence or lose it, file reasons for the appeal, supply an 
attested copy of the evidence at own expense, pay fee for jury service and 
so on, and all this "without reflecting on Court or parties by provoking 
8 language." A far cry from modern requiremsnts but an excellent illus-
tration of the manner in which rights can be so qualified as to become prao-
tioally valueless. 
An appeal, in its technical sense, is a method of review "when and 
only when it is established by constitutional or statutory provision." 
The right of review by appeal in criminal oases is not an inherent, 
natural or inalienable right; such right is a matter of grace which 
the state can extend or withhold as it deems fit or which it may 
grant on such terms as it sees fit. The right is unknown at the 
common law and if it exists at all it is by virtue of some consti-
tutional provision or statutory enactment. 9 
Although historical review may seem tedious and irrelevant to sane 
well versed in the field, and a far cry f'ran fifty current oases, the writer 
believes that one cannot properly understand the significance and implica-
tions of' the modern system without some knowledge of how it eame into being, l 
in what ways it has changed, how it happened to develop into the pattern 
now familiar and, above all, the challenge it poses to most thoughtful con-
sideration before one proposes radical changes which might endanger the 
p.40. 
8 Emory Washburn, Sketches .2£ ~ Judicial History ~ lla.ssachusetts, 
9 ~ C.J.S. Criminal Law, s.l628. 
I' 
whole structure and its practical operation -- in a word, without sufficient 
knowledge one might easily repeat the mistakes of' the past in the ne.me of' 
progress. 
It should be clear by this time that the Massachusetts right of' jury 
trial and appeal is as applicable to delinquency as to criminal situations 
but one should also know that other States have struggled with the eonsti tu-
tionality of' juvenile theory and practice and have reached dif'f'erent end re-
sults. Sane early decisions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New Hampshire 
first decided against the new development in the law. The advent of' the 
first juvenile court, in Cook County, Illinois, was postponed tor some f'ive 
years on the legal advice of' the counselors to the pioneering group which 
finally made history there in 1899. 
The famous decision in Commonwealth vs Fisher, 213 Pa.48, 1905, report-! 
ed at length in McCUrdy10 is frequently cited f'or the principle that delin-
31 
quency is not crime and that criminal laws and procedures do not apply, there-
tore, to delinquency matters, and, in that case, a jury trial was held not 
to be necessary. lladden11 assures us that the question was similarly de-
cided by Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, South Car-
olina and Virginia. Significantly enough, however, and most important tor 
our consideration, is the f'aot that Massachusetts is not so listed tor the 
simple reason that the precise point has not been adjudicated here. Suppose 
the right to appeal should be withheld f'rom delinquents here? Suppose a 
jury trial should be denied to them? Would it not put into issue the whole 
10 William E. McCurdy, Cases on The Law of' Persons and Domestic Re-
lations, pp.80l f'f'. - - -- - -
11 Joseph W. Kadddn, Handbook~.!!!!.~ 2!. Persons and Domestic 
Relations, pp.379 tt. ---~t-j[_====-= 
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constitutionality of our juvenile procedure? What would be the ultimate 
decision? One could not forecast with certainty but, it would seem, that 
the established method, with forty-five years or practice behind it, could 
not easily be changed. Statutes can be amended, even repealed, but con-
stitutional changes are entirely a different matter and it seems quite like-
ly that any proposed radical changes would have to face a constitutional 
challenge and test. 
The pertinent MSssachusetts statute on delinquency appeal is section 
fifty-six or Chapter 119, while section eighty-one of the same chapter cov-
ers juvenile offenders, that is, those delinquents who are made the subjects 
of straight criminal complaints. 
Section fifty-six states that "a child adjudged a wayward or delin-
quent child mey appeal to the superior court upon adjudication" and "also 
may appeal to said court at the time of the order of commitment or sentenoe" 
and smll be notified of his right so to appeal. Although the same section! 
says that "the appeal, if taken, shall be tried and determined in like man-
ner as appeals in criminal oases," the Sylvester case, cited supra, rules 
that "such proceedings are not deemed criminal proceedings." The appeal is 
that of the child, not the parent, and may be taken or waived in the absence 
of the parent, as decided in Robinson vs Comnomreal th.12 From the Sylves-
ter case one also learns that an appeal "must be taken forthwith or is as-
sUJDed to have been waived." 
Although Alper13 seemed to say that these two rights of appeal for 
children dated from 1906, it is a fact that the appeal from the adjudication 
12 242 Mass. 401 (1925). 
13 Alper, 21?.•2.!!• 1 p.340. 
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was parmi tted in 1906 and the subsequent and additional appeal fran oommi t-
ment or sentence was added, by amendment, in 1927.14 
According to Cosulioh's compilation for the National Probation Asso-
ciation,15 Massachusetts seems to be the only State having this double ap-
II 
peal feature, as he ci tea no similar arrangement in a:ny other jurisdiction. 
It mst be confessed, havrever, that he does not mention Massachusetts either l 
although his volume was dated 1939 and was supposed to be a semi-official 
publication; perhaps the idea is truly unique. 
The llassaohusetts appeal syat811l has been heartily condemned as ak-
ward, oumbersaue, repetitious, unnecessary, contrary to the spirit of the 
juvenile law and directly contributing to the overcrowding of the superior 
court, the flouting of the district courts and badly in need ot aundaJMntal 
changes. Senate No.330 of 1916, Rouse No.l200 of 1931, the Judicial Coun-
cil, Lumrmls and Alper definitely held these views. What remedy was pro-
posed? The Nineteenth Report, 1943, of' the Judicial Council suggested an 
appellate arrangement similar to that now provided for the civil side of' the 
district courts, that is, an appeal to a court of three district judges only 
on questions of law and subject to a final appeal, under certain conditions, 
to the SupreiM Judicial Court, again only on matters of law. The civil plan ll 
waa adopted and put into operation, after a ten-year trial in the Boston lm-
nicipa.l Court, in 1922 but the analagous criminal plan has made no progress. 
Would it be constitutional? Probably so, but only if the defendant sub-
mi. tted himself to such a tribunal. No Report since tm Nineteenth has men-
14 !!!!·~·~.,Ch.ll9, s.56 (Amended 1927, Ch.18l,s.l). 
15 Gilbert Cosulioh, Juvenile Court~ 2!_ ~United States, 
pp.76-'18. 
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the procedures or the lower courts are constitutional as long as the ac-
cused has a right or appeal to a superior court for a jury trial; this de-
cision has not since been qualified or distinguished and is cited in the 
most recent reports as our lmr on this ma.tter. 
The Massachusetts statutes applicable are precise on the right o£ 
appeal, as originally enacted in 1906 and as amended in 1927. In tact, 
Massachusetts seems to be unique in that not one but two rights or appeal 
are provided. 
Although our currant appeal system has been heartily condemned in 
the past by most eminent authorities it is now a raot that the Legislature, 
through its committees, last spoke on the subject in 1940, on which occa-
sion it decisively rejected any change in the law and stated that, in my 
case, appeals were infrequent. 
The Judicial Council of Massachusetts has not mentioned the subject 
since 1943, at which time it reviewed the arguments in the controversy and 
proposed a change analagous to that made in the procedure on the civil side 
of' t.bs lower courts. At the moment the subject seems to be quiescent in 
Massachusetts. 
Although the point does not seem to have been precisely stated in so 
maey words , it seems clear from long accepted usuage that our juvenile prac I 
tice end procedure is inextricably tied in with constitutional rights o.r ju• 
ry trials and appeals from the lower crurts as inherent parts o.r those 
rights. 
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CH.APrER IV 
THE E'R.EQl.JENCY OF APPE.ALS 
.An important, fundamental question that is always raised in this 
discussion of t he appeal situation is the simple one involving frequency 
because it seems to be generally accepted now that appeals are no more than 
to be expected and so long e.s the ratio to total oases remains reasonably 
low there is no real problem. The Special Commission of 1940, in House 
No.600, previously noted, stated as a finding that the right to appeal "is 
not frequently exercised" and no other Commission has since discussed the 
subject. It seems, therefore, that an attempt should be made to discover 
the usual appeal ratio end hazard a judgment as to its reasonableness. 
In the adult field, the figures of one municipal court of Suffolk 
County show a total of 195,218 arrests in a twenty-six year period, begin-
ning with 1924 and running to and including 1949; the number of cases ap-
pealed amounted to 5,103; the ratio of appeals to total oases was 2.6 per 
cent.1 This is the same distriot from which the fifty juvenile cases 
are principally taken. 
A report covering all the Massachusetts district courts, except Bos-
ton MUnicipal Court, from October l, 1937 to September 30, 1938, showed a 
total of 149,569 adult criminal cases, 5,375 appeals, with a ratio of 3.6 
per cent. 2 Two years later, the figures for 1940-1941 showed 167,885 and 
4,637 or a ratio of 2.8 per cent. Four years later, 1942-1943, revealed 
1 Judicial Council, .2f·~· ,First to Twenty-fi.:rth Reports,inclusive. 
2 Judicial Council, 2£·~. ,Fourteenth Report ,1938, pp. 86-87. 
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125,486 and 3,527, or a ratio of 2.8 per cent, while 1944-1946 produced 
106,936 and 2,609 for a ratio of 2.6 per cent. The ratio of 1945-1946 
was only 2.3 per cent, based on 135,176 cases end 3,118 appeals,. 3 The 
latest available figures, from the same source, for the year ending Septem-
4 ber 30, 1949, are 157,988 cases, 3,462 appeals and a ratio of 2.2 per cent. 
To give further evidence, en examination will be made of two addi-
tional years of adult figures, as prepared and presented by the State De-
partment of Correction. For the year ending December 31, 1945, the totals 
for the district courts, including Boston Municipal Court, amounted to 
141,861 oases with 3,686 appeals, or a ratio of 2.6 per cent. 5 For the 
year ending December 31, 1946, covering the same courts, the totals were 
182,513 and 3,678, the ratio being 1.96 or 2.0 per cent. 6 
It seems clear, from these unselected, large samplings, that the 
adult appeal rate runs fran 2.0 to 3.6 per cent, or from two to frur per 
cent of tM total number of cases heard, with the lower figure being the 
more recent one. 
A word or caution should be inserted here on the nature of eompara-
tive figures end the problem of reconciliations in this area. After con-
sidereble experieiiCe in the past ffi!IW years, the writer has found it impos-
sible to cheek one source of statistics against another without analysis 
end calculation. To put it another way: the yearly figures from our one 
Suffolk court are taken directly from the daily court sheets and the docket 
books of that court, cover calendar years and are measured, in the juvenile 
3 Judicial Council, 2E.·~· ,Twenty-second Report ,1946, p.93. 
4 Judicial Council, .2f•.:_!!•,Twenty-fifth Report,l949, p.47. 
5 C~ssioner of Correotion,op.oit.,l945-1946, p.70. 
--
6 ~·· p.l68. 
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data at least, by a four-unit system which counts cases, charges, oase boys 
and individual boys while the clerk's office makes its individual report 
which, in years past, frequently differed from the facts as registered in 
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the probation department, although the clerk's figures, accurate or inaccu-
rate, were the official ones; the Massachusetts Board of Probation totals, 
for the past ten years, have been based on calendar years and case boys and 
are entered as they are "disposed of," as the Department terminology has it~ 
the Boston Police Department year runs fran December 1st to November 30th 
and counts as arrests mere "suspicious persons," "disorderly persons," re-
bookings and interstation transfers and similar activities that are not ar-
rests in the statistics of the courts; the Administrative Committee of the 
District Courts counts its year from October 1st to September 30th and does 
not include Boston Municipal Court nor Boston Juvenile Court in its totals 
and takes the figures as reported by the various clerks; the Department of 
Correction uses the calendar year and takes totals as reported by the clerks, 
sometimes with unreal results as we have previously noted. That Department 
incidentally, is about to publish its report for the years 1947 and 1948. 
What do juvenile appeal ratios amount to, as contrasted with adult 
appeals, always remembering that a child has two rights of appeal? 
Our one Suffolk cwrt showed a ratio of 3.5 per cent for a ten-year 
period, running fran November 12,1938 to a:td including November 11, 1948, 
based on 1,157 ease boys with forty appeals. The same court, for a .t'ull 
quarter-century, 1925-l949,inclusive, shmted a total of 4,455 oase boys and 
130 appeals, or a ratio of 2.9 per cent, as itemized in Table I on the fol- I 
lowing page. "Case boys," incidentally, means nothing more than the total 
number of boys appearing before a court, including repeaters, as distingui~-
I 
II 
ed fran "individual boys," which registers the actual number of persons; a 
child could qualify as two or more "case boys" during a particular year or 
period but could never be more than one "individual boy." 
Looking again at the Department of Correction reports covering 1941 
to 1946, inolusive,7 which were war years, by the wey, one may tabulate the 
available figures in the categories of total case boys, appeals, and sus- 11 
pended sentences, the latter being of particular significance in relation to 
appeals, and it will reveal a State total, exclusive of Boston Juvenile 
Court, of 37,715 boys, 5,243 of wham received suspended orders of commitment 
or sentences, and 656 appeals; the suspended sentences are 13.9 per cent and 
the appeals 1.7 per cent of the total number of case boys before the courts. 
The Boston Juvenile Court, for the se.Jm period, had totals of 4,062 case boy 
with 748 suspended sentences and fifty-eight appeals or 18.4 per cent sus-
pended sentences and 1.4 per cent appeals. The juvenile session of the Rox 
bury .Municipal Court, for the same period, had 3,551 case boys, 734 suspend• 
ed sentences and 153 appeals, or 20.7 per cent suspended sentences and 4.3 
per cent appeals, the latter being the highest of all appeal ratios we have 
noticed. The Suffolk court, which is our principal interest, had 855 case 
boys, seventy-nine suspended sentences and eleven appeals for the same peri-
od, or 9.2 per cent suspended sentences and 1.3 per cent appeals. Since 
the writer knows, for a certainty, that the appeals for that period totaled 
thirty-one end not eleven, a solid reliance end trust in these statistics ll 
is understandably missing. The figures are official, however, coming from 
the public documents cited in Footnote No.7 below. To correct this item, 
7 Commissioner of Correction,~·~·· Statistical Reports for 
1941-1942, 1943-1944 and 1945-1946J "Delinquent Children" end "Boston 
Juvenile Court." 
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the ratio of the thirty-one appeals would be 3.6 per cent of the 
ber of case boys. 
An aspect of the overall problem that is extremely interesting and 
important is the liberal provision that permits appeal even attar a person 
has been a failure on probation and is surrendered to the court, a feature 
that was especially irritating to Justice Lummus and to the Judicial Coun-
oil. This situation is alweys possible because probation, as distinguish-
ed .from a suspended sentence with probation, is a tentative, not final, dis ' 
position; when a child accepts a suspended sentence, of course, such a re-
served right of appeal is waived or lost. 8 Just how often does this situ-
ation occur? According to the Massachusetts Board of Probation, in report 1 
ing probation results for the eight years 1940 to and including 1947, a to-
tal of 157,062 persons, adults and children, both sexes, were under some 
form of probation but only 493 appealed, presumably after surrender, for a 
ratio of 0.3 per cent. Of the boys, alone, there was a total of 17,060 
boys, with thirty-seven suoh appeals, or a ratio o.f 0.2 per cent.9 The only 
reasonable explanation is that the great majority of those surrendered were 
under suspended sentences or that their straight probation oases were .filed 
as a part ot some subsequent disposition involving new cases. 
The report just cited, signi.fioantly or otherwise, does not state 
the number of appeel.ed cases during the eight years covered by the survey. 
Likewise, the yearly report of the Administrative Committee, although it 
gives the total number of juvenile cases during the year, excluding Boston 
8 Santo Mariano vs Judge of District Court of Central Berkshire, 
243 :Mass. 9o (1922). - - -
9 Board of Probation, ~.cit. ,Report 1940-1947, p.l7. 
Juvenile Court, does not mention the number of appeals; it does show the 
total of adult appeals. 
Alper's studyl0 of 415 oases noted that 40.2 per cent were appeals 
from adjudication of delinquency and 59.8 per cent were appeals from com-
mi tment orders. The fifty oases of our Suffolk court showed an even 50.0 
per cent for each group, twenty-five boys appealing from findings and twen-
ty-five from dispositions. The statistics of the Department of Correction 
do not distinguish between appeals from findings and from dispositions. The 
other reports examined did not mention the subject. 
When considering the "Delinquent Children" tables, as prepared by 
the Department of Correction in its cited reports, one notices that most 
of the juvenile appeals seem to center in Suffolk County and some other 
courts, noticeably Worcester Court, have an unbelievably low rate of' ap-
peals, e.g. Central Worcester, 1945, with 678 defendants and no appeals at 
all. Suspecting error, one looks at the 1946 report f'or the same court 
and finds a total of 460 with three appeals; 1942, 427 oases and no ap-
·I peals; 1941, 412 eases and six appeals. In 1945 Worcester had no more 
I than en 8.9 per cent ratio of suspended sentences to total oases. It might 
be interred that many minor offences are unnecessarily brought into court 
because 60.4 per cent of the total were discharged, dismissed or filed. 
The method of announcing the right of appeal differs in various 
courts, there being no statutory for.m of expression, and this fact could 
explain some of' the variances. There are judges who will say, in effect, 
that if' the child believes that the judge has not been fair with him and 
II wishes another judge to hear the case over again then en appeal may be 
10 Alper, ~.cit., p.366. 
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taken. How many children will dare to tell aey judge that they think he hasl 
been unfair, particularly when they are surrounded with all the pomp and 
ceremony of the courtroom? Other judges will announce that they will 
place the child on probation or under a suspended sentence if there is no 
appeal. Most judges, however, simply announce personally, or through thei 
clerks, their findings or dispositions and then add: "You have a right of 
appeal to the Superior Court from this finding" or "sentence" or "order of 
commitment." Use of bail terms has been known to affect appeal ratios, 
and the amounts are sometimes very stiff, differing for different offences, 
-
as Alper noted. The presence of an attorney is another important factor, 
as will later appear. 
Alper found "as high as one-fifth of" the decisions of the lower 
courts appeal~d in 1931-1935, inclusive, 11 but the basis of his authority 
is not clear to this writer after a careful study of his article, particu-
larly as the total number of case boys involved for that period is not shown 
anywhere in the study, merely the total number of appeals appearing as the 
basic f~gure. 
The appeal ratio revealed by checking appeals against commitments is 
another matter and the 34.4 per cent found by Alper in this category is a 
startling commentary on the conclusiveness of commitment orders by the low-
er courts. To check this factor for the same period, the writer counted 
the commitments and appeals of the Suffolk court in which he is primarily 
interested and got the totals of fifty-eight commitments and forty-three 
appeals during those ye8.l"s or the amazing fact that 42.6 per oent of the 
11 Alper, ~·~·, p.366. 
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decisions were successfully thwarted by the children by their mere refUsal 
to accept them. To further test the validity of this result, similar cal-
culations were made for the period of 1945-1949, inclusive, end the answer 
II was 45.6 per cent. In short, for a twenty-five year period, the percentage 
was 36.0, as may be verified by the totals of 231 commitments and 130 ap-
peals, as noted in Table I. 
It becomes very clear that the bases upon which these percentages 
are £igured should always be watched with en analytical eye. The total of 
2.9 per cent, "a matter of little frequency," becomes the total of 36.0, a 
substantial nullification of lower court authority and judgment. It is to 
wondered whether the Special Commission of 1940, previously cited, realized 
the significance of these figures. 
J
1 
To summarize this chapter, we find that the following aspects of the 
'I subject should be noted and considered when this topic is being discussed. II 
It seems to be currently held that appeal rights are "not frequently 
exercised." 
Great care must be used in attempting to compare the totals of vari-
ous official agencies because of varying systems of counting totals and de-
termining yearly periods. 
A fair sampling of adult appeals showed a ratio of from two to four 
per cent of the total number of oases heard in the lower courts. 
One Suffolk court showed a total of 2.9 per cent of appeals, on the 
basis of case boys, for a quarter of a century, but with 3.5 per cent for :1 
the past ten years of that period. 
II Boston Juvenile Court still seems to have the lowest ratio of appeals 
and Roxbury Lmn.icipal Court the highest in recent years, in Suffolk County. 
l 
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The extraordinary figures for Worcester are difficult to interpret without 
personal knowledge of the practice there. 
Boston Juvenile and Roxbury Courts had twice as many suspended or-
ders of oommi tment as the one Sui'.follc court of our .fifty oases. 
Very few children, or adults either, seem to appeal after being sur-
rendered on probation, although they have such a right. 
There would appear to be a strange lack of interest in this area 
when weighty o.f.fioial reports do not bother to list appeal totals, although 
almost everything else is mentioned. The Department of Correction seems 
to be the only important srurce of data in this matter. 
There are various ways of presenting to a child his right to appeal, 
som of which are forthright~ fair and simple, and others that suggest a 
show of .false paternal solicitude that, in affect, defeats the statutory 
expression of the right. This factor should be stated as otherwise fre-
quency figures may become misleading and misunderstood. 
When the total of appeals is contrasted with the total of commit-
ments, the ratio of appeals is very high, and it then becomes clear that 
the percentages based on total oases or boys do not reveal the true pic-
ture, namely, that the authority and judgment of the lower courts is accept 
able only when it please& the child, or family, or attorney, and a substan-
tial veto or nullification exists in this vital matter. 
II 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CAUSES OF APPEAlS 
The answer to one of the principal questions is one of the most in-
teresting, particularly when one hears the explanations, on the conscious 
level at any rate, of the boys themselves or of their parents. The purpose 
of this experiment and the technique employed were discussed on Pages 8 and 
9, supra, under "Methods." 
Although such answers are prima facie evidence of the reasons in-
volved, one l!D.lst always keep in mind the various factors that may have be-
ol ouded the situation. For instance, some boys have answered in terms 
that were thought to be more acceptable to the inquiring probation officer 
who, after all, is a reality in their lives and in the community, one who 
may be a factor in their immediate future; others have merely been agree-
able or willing or even anxious to please or to assist the questioner;still 
I 
others had little or no understanding, even at more mature years, of their 
motivations; many were glad to talk, especially if they had done reasonably 
well since the appeal, a form or boasting or self-justification that sug-
gested that they were not so very wrong, after all; others may not have 
oared to recall or discuss painfUl incidents of the dead past and were not 
subjected to inconsiderate invasions of such areas; a ff1'N were pathetioallJ I 
eager to participate in the process, seeing themselves as central figures 
in a book or as subjects of local memoirs in which they had played a part. 
It is a source of illllllense personal satisfaction that there was aui'fioient 
trust in the purposes of the examiner to insure, in most oases, straight-
forward r-esponses, free of fear of any ulterior motives, ani even a willin~ 
II 
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=4--:: .. to be of assistance. but. it must be confessed, that the level of un-
derstand.ing in too many instances • was none too high. as will readily be 
seen in the verbatim answers that will follow. 
There is a serious teolmical d.i.f.ficul ty, that of best presenting 
this material. I.f a chronological order is not acceptable, then a class-
i.fied arrangement will be o.f.fered, remembering that any such identi.fica-
tions are wholly subjective and matters of opinion. The assertions recor 
ed will be those o.f the boys • or of the parents, as of the time stated in 
Figure I, herewith filed in the Appendix. Where no direct statements havJ1 
I 
been seoured, the circumstances at the time o.f the hearing will be noted i ! 
they offer an obvious or rational explanation for the action taken. It can.JI 
not be too strongly emphasized that the motivations rarely are singular,in I 
sofar as they can be distinguished, but are usually of a complex. hetero- i 
geneous nature, as varied as the situations and the personalities that II 
gave rise .to them. The same assertions. therefore, may be found in more 
than one class, as different interpretations may be reasonably placed upon 
the same words • Why are the subsequent headings used at all? They are 
merely arrangements of convenience and presentation. They really are 
class or summary labels for the inferences deduced from the material. that 
is, the group descriptions were determined by the deductions, not the la-
bels postulated first and the material arranged or tailored to .fit under 
that particular class heading. The reference numbers will be as of the 
chronological order, the identity code being ommitted here since it could 
be of no interest nor assistance to the reader. 
)I 
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Fear: 
ttw"ell, you know, he was locked up and we wanted to get him out." ( 14) 
"I didn't want to go away; that was the only reason." ( 15) 
"I didn't want my boy to go to that reform school; they come out bad. "1 
"I wasn't bad; that place is for bad boys." (17) 
ni didn't want to be put away." (45) 
"I wanted to get out of it." (29) 
"I wanted to get out of it." ( 14) 
The first and third assertions were those of mothers; the others 
were those of the boys themselves. 
48 
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Fear, general and specific, vague, unknown, is almost always involved! 
in these motivations for appeal, in addition to the obvious and reasonable 
fears of frustration of custody, loss of freedom, forcible detachment from 
home, parents and environment, disgrace, punishment and so on. All of the 
persons quoted above, boys end mothers, knew fear end wanted to get away 
from it if possible. 
Hostility to authority: 
In a wild courtroom scene, boy attempted to attack the judge. (3) 
Boy absolutely refused to attend any school on any terms. (6) 
"Police would never tell the truth; everyone knows that." (19) 
"Too much writing in these courts; they know all about you." (25) 
The first and second instances happened in the courtroom at the time. 
The assertions in the third and fourth instances were those of the fathers 
of the two boys concerned. 
Hostility, toward police,court, community, parents, school or auth-
ority, per se" is always en element to some degree. The fathers of 19 and 
25 ~ad had unhappy experiences, on their own accounts, with police and 
courts in times past. 3 had been previously arrested nine times. 6 was a 
very intelligent boy, son of an alcoholic father; he did not, har1ever, 
transfer any hostility to court officials. The frustration of custody,the 
fear thus aroused, added to rejection by authority is understandably suffi- I 
cient to generate hostility, momentary or lasting, superficial or deep-seat-
ed. 
Refusal to face reality: 
"You know, you want to postpone it; put it off; all them reasons.~ (3) 
"Reason? To try to get out of it." (21) 
"I know why I appealed; I was hoping somebody would came along and bail 
me out." (7) 
"My father appealed." (48) II 
"The police pick on him." (32) Mother of parolee on eighth arrest. 
"Because he was sentenced to Lyman." (22) Mother. Eight stolen oars. 
"He didn't hit him; the other :fellow had held out (money) on him." (18) 
"Because he was sentenced to Shirley." (23)Father. Eight stolen oars. 
Father resentful; would not accept :finding and probation although he 
knew that stolen goods had been :found on boy. "He :f'otmd. them." (36) 
This boy rejected finding, although caught in the act. He was then 
awaiting a Grand Jury on other oases in other jurisdictions. (16) 
Statements of 3,21, 7 and 48 are of boys themselves; 3 and 21 had 
serious records, 7 was on parole and 48 had admitted his guilt. 32 and 22 
were mothers and 18, 23 and 36 were fathers. 16 speaks for itselr. 
Refusal to face reality is a common situation, manifesting itself 
even on ninth md tenth arrests, even where delinquency is admitted. It 
seems to evidence itself in evading or postponing all thoughts of respon-
sibility or discipline, desperate temporizing and delaying, as distinguish-
ed :from the purposeful delay that is planned in the hope of discouraging 
and wearing out complainants and witnesses particularly. It is difficult 
to distinguish this factor from the honest hope of escaping from a danger-
ous predicament, in some cases, so perhaps these two :factors should be coup-
led as degrees o:f' one cause. Eight of the fifty boys were parolees at the 
time of their appeals, that is, already under commitment :for their minority; 
, they had practically no hope of escape, as they rust have known. It is al- 11 
so common to see parents, confronted with convincing evidence, refuse to ac-
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cept it, perhaps a species of shock reaction, particularly when they had hadl 
no previous reason to suspect delinquent activities. I ~===#= 
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Dependency reactions: l 
"I knorr why I appealed; I was hoping somebody would oome along and bail 
me out." ( 17) A parolee then. J 
"M¥ grandfather thought he could get me out of it; he used to know a lo 
of politicians." (6) 
"I was caught there? I must get out of it somehow; get my mother." His 
grandfather, also, "knew a lot of politicians." A parolee at time. 
These three statements were from the boys, themselves, as of the 
times noted in Figure I. 31 denied being in a stolen automobile but when 
he learned that he had struck a bus and had been taken to a hospital from 
the street, his first reaction was as quoted, supra. 
Dependency reactions are practically always evident, the "somebody 
must help me" attitude, the appeal to a higher father figure or the desper- ~ 
ate dependence on awn parents, whose counsels have been defied, or the fran-
tic use of social assets, friendships or public personages -- personal, po- I 
litical, legal, social workers, religious leaders and so on, the forces that 
attempt to influence or importune harassed court off'icials. Although it is 
customary to condemn politicians, officer holders or office seekers, there 
are social working and sacerdotal politicians quite as obnoxious and unrea-
eJ f:c l- c.l. 
sonable as any of the democraticallyAbrand. These boys had been flagrant-
ly delinquent and two of them were on parole. 
Adult influences: 
"MY grandfather thought he could get me out of it." (6) Boy. 
This family would not accept a finding and a filed case; let it known 
that it had influential friend•·" (10) 
"His father appealed; we felt we should do all we could for him." (26) 
"It was J'I.1:Y father who appealed." (30) Boy. 
"My father appealed." ( 48) Boy. 
"He's only a kid; he was only drunk." (40) Father rejected a filed case.
1 
"Too llDloh writing in these courts; they know all about you." (25) Father 
Mother, herself on probation, told boy to appeal. (4) Mother, father I 
and tive siblings, the whole family, had records. 1 
Boy said he wanted to go wherever his adult "friend" went. (37) A morals 
case. The boy's mother said nothing. 
Father tried to appeal as soon as complaint was read. (47) 
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It was a mother speaking of 26; the boy had three subsequent arrests 
before he finally settled down after accepting the probation which was re-
jected in the instant case. The father of 47 was an alcoholic who, himself 
which often include rationalization, mitigation, blind rejection, hostile 
projection and other protective mechanisms or their own personal identifica-
tions, aggressions, strengths and weaknesses. Very often fathers see a II 
challenge to their paternal position or status in these situations and feel 
that they have "to do something." 
Legal advice: 
Attorney told probation officer that his fee would be twenty-five dol-
lars higher if he could get probation for his client. (1) 
Attorney, a poli tieian, pleaded with oourtt "Do it for me." ( 8) 
Attorney, a politician, ready to appeal before the hearing. (10) 
Attorney, a politician, ready to appeal before the hearing. (46) 
"My lawyer will get me out ot it; he's ~senator." (41) Boy. 
"MY lawyer appealed." (33) Boy, a parolee at time. 
Attorney asked to appeal, to see what he "could do in town." (27) Boy 
was under a suspended sentence at time and he wanted to avoid arl adjudi-
caticn. 
Attorney, a politician, came in ready to appeal. (47) Boy had been 
caught in the aot of larceny with the stolen goods in his possession. 
1
1 Legal reasons are a most common cause of appeals, as witness twenty-
two of this group of ti.fty oases. Almost every attorney will assert that 
appeal is a legal right, not a privilege, although "the real 'right' is the 
right to a jury trial, if a party wishes it, and this may be preserved in 
other ways than by appeel.nl Usually, of course, there is no attempt to 
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seek a jury trial, as a subsequent analysis of the oases will clearly show. 
Sometimes there could be sincere disagreement with local procedure and poli-, 
I cy or decisions but almost always the ego involvement ot counsel, the will 
I 
to win or dominate, becomes a factor and they feel that they must be victorl1 
ious before their clients; this is probably particularly true of those mam-
bars ot the bar who have political ambitions. There is also a less ethi-
cal, less honorable, possibility, in that two trials or hearings, instead 
ot one, may mean an increased or additional fee. It should also have been 
noted that the size of the tee may be determined by the type of disposition 
secured. Some counsel merely use the lower courts to scout or learn the 
facts of the controversy in order to better meet, rebut or explain it in the 
higher court. It is further true, ot course, that attorneys well under-
stand the value and use of delay in these matters to~ the reasons stated on 
Page 49, supra. These inferences are all logically deducible from the ma-
terial noted above and they present nothing new nor startling to anyone who 
has spent much time in the halls of justice. 
Reputation of · higher court for leniency: 
"You have a chance of getting a better break in high court." (3) Boy. 
"I figured I'd get a better break in high court." (24) Boy. 
"They don't WTite so much upstairs." (25) Father. 
"Don't take the commitment; we can do better upstairs." (28) Brother. 
"Do you think I'd get worse upstairs?" "I might get probation. I'll 
take a chance." (50) Boy. 
"Kaybe he'd be not guilty intown; we tried it anyhow." (2) Mother of 
parolee who had been caught in a stolen automobile. 
"A jury would not believe the police." (19) Fath~r. 
:I 
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The general reputation tor leniency that is associated with the high-
e·r court is a constant factor in the appeal situation. Some ot the reason~ 
commonly known, are the increased distance in time and place from thelocal 
scene; the excellent possibility of bargaining for better terms; the rela-
,, 
tive unimportance of delinquency matters in such an important court; the ll 
lack of juvenile departments, as such, to show an intensive, primary inter-
est in such oases; the elective personnel, excepting judges and probation 
officers, who staff the higher court; the known experiences of friends and 
neighbors from the home district. In some instances, as has been noted, 
it actually becomes a sort of family tradition -- father made it when he 
was a boyS Those who were boys when Alper wrote his paper, in 1935. knew 
the answers; now that it is 1951, the boys have changed but the answers seem, 
to be substantially the same. 
Ego satisfaction: 
"I did it again." ( 41) Boy. 
The investigator was truly surprised to hear only this one overt ex-
pression of ego satisfaction because he had supposed that it was a component 
factor in many instances. If the boys had, in any degree, felt that way at 
the time they must have since rejected or ~esolved that concept of immaturi-
ty. In any case., no one else mentioned it nor seemed to look back on his 
experience with pride. 
Psychological suggestion: 
His friend appealed, so he appealed; later wished to withdraw it. (39) 
His friend appealed, so he appealed; later wished to withdraw it. (20) 
His friend appealed first, so he appealed. (43) and (44) 
The element of psychological suggestion is observed, from time to 
time, particularly where several or a group of boys are concerned. The 
first to respond, not always the leader, often sets the pattern for his 
companions. Frequently these boys or their parents ask to withdraw such 
appeals and this is usually permitted; if they insist upon such a right it 
must be granted, in accordance with Chapter 311 of the Acts of 1937. 
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Refusal to make restitution: 
Three boys, and their parents, accepted findings that they had wantonly 
smashed a plate glass window, a possible racial persecution matter, but 
one father appealed when restitution was demanded and the two mothers of 
the other boys followed suit. (42, 43 and 44) 
Occasionally there may be seen the frank, irresponsible attitude 
that admits delinquency readily, hopes for some form of probation but abso-
lutely rebels at the injunction to reimburse the injured party, to pay res-
titution for property damage or larceny. These particular boys got off 
I' 
II 
II soot fr.ee and the embittered shopkeeper was le.rt to his own devices. There 
ar~ those who can support their guilt without difficulty provided they do 
not have to pay for it. 
Poor reputation of training schools: 
"I didn't want my boy to go to that reform school; they come out bad." 
"I wasn't bad; that place is for bad boys." (Both 17, mother and boy.) 
"!ecause he was sentenced to Lyman." ( 22) Mother. 
"Because he was sentenced to Shirley." (23) Father. 'I 
A very important faotor in attempting to avoid commi.tment is the wide 
spread fear, particularly on the part of adults, that reform schools do not 
reform. In short, our training schools, rightly or wrongly, do not enjoy J 
good reputations but, on the contrary, have bad ones. One of these boys 
had beaten a police officer and his fmnily thought that he should be punish-
ed or corrected but not in a place for ttbad boys." Another of the boys had 
stolen eight automobiles and, although the family was revolted at the 
thought of a reform school, he was subsequently enrolled by his parents in 
a private correctional school. The third boy in this group seemed to have 
been influenced by the second one and when the latter went away to school 
he settled down without further difficulty. 
-
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Lack of understanding: 
"We didn't know any better; we tried it anyhow." (2) Mother. 
"I didn't know what to do; somebody told me to say it." (38) Mother. 
"I didn't know what to do." Tried to withdraw appeal. (49) Father. 
'I 
I, 
This boy wanted to withdraw his appeal; said he didn't understand. ( 20) II 
This mother had no conception of its significance, then or now. She said 
someone told her to appeal; she was afraid to say anything. (34) 
Most of these children naturally look to their parents for guidance 
in such an important situation but some of the parents, through fear, igno-
ranee, stupidity or suggestion, make contused spot decisions and then often 
wish to change them later. Strangely enough, however, in every one of the 
instances noted above, save one, the children had been in court before, ac-
companied by the same parents; in the one exception, the father was ade-
quately informed beforehand. 
Rational refusal to accept decision: 
"I believed he was not guilty that time." 
"He didn't hit him." 
"I really didn't think he did it." 
( 15) Father. 
( 18) Father. 
(42) Mother. 
There is always the situation in which there is a rational refusal 
to accept the decision of a lower court, in which the child, parent or at-
. .... 
torney is in sincere disagreement with the decision, as distinguished from 
mere unreasoning non-acceptance, and then exercises the constitutional righ~ 
of appeal. The investigator was on friendly terms with the parents here 
interviewed and assumed that they were telling the truth as they sew it. It 
was surprising, however, that this factor did not came up more often; if 
it existed, as it must have in soma cases, it was not expressed during this 
survey. 
Mere Refusal to aooept decision: 
"I wanted to get out of it." (4) Boy. Had been given several chances. 
"I didn't want to go mve:y; that was the only reason." (5) Boy. This w I 
his sixth arrest at the time; repeated probation failure. 
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"I didn't want to go away." (6) Boy. Yet he refUsed to attend school. 
"I know wh¥ I appeabd; I .was hoping somebody would come along and bail 
me out." (7) Boy. A parolee on eighth arrest at time. 
"I just wanted to get out of it, if I could; that was the only reason." 
(11) Boy. Had record and attempted to intimidate a witness. 
"I tried to get out of it." (13) Boy. Was an parole at time. 
"Because he was sentenced to Lyman." (22) Mother. Eight automobiles. 
"Because he was sentenced to Shirley."(23) Father. Eight automobiles. 
"I must get out of it somehow." (31) Boy. Was on parole at time. 
"I didn't want to be put away." (45) Boy. Gun; previous record. 
"I wanted to get out of it." (9) Boy. Early morning breaks. 
"We tried it anyhow." ( 2) Mother. Boy on parole. 
Boy on eighth arrest; then on parole. (12) 
Boy on fourth arrest and under suspended sentence. (27) 
Attorney and mother ready to appeal befor~ hearing. (46) 
Attorney and father ready to appeal before hearing. (47) 
It seems to the writer that the evidence set forth herewith carries 
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its own inferences as clearly as any interpreter could hope to explain them. 
Most of these instances represent absolute abuses of the appeal system in II 
its fundamental purposes and philosophy, the situation that is unanimously 
condenmed by all the authorities who have written about it, and which im-
pels most of them to propose drastic legal changes in methods of handling 
it. On the other hand, principally from a legal viewpoint, there are many 
serious legal scholars who, while joining in the condemnation, believe that 
it must be endured, as a price that must be paid for the inestimable privi-
lege of an appeal to one's peers, that protects an individual, even a child I 
from any possible arbitrar.y misuse of power by the State or the officials 
representing it. The writer has heard at least a dozen judges voice this 
sentiment. The relative weights to be given these contrasting views is I 
the essence of the problem here. ,, 
The writer further believes that this chapter cannot be honestly oo~ 
plated without mention of another factor, stated on Page 3, supra, that too 
frequent, arbitrary reversals by the higher court "encourage indifference II 
and evasion of responsibility on the part of both local courts and police." 
I 
:1 
This factorJ not readily discernible and practically never openly admitted, 
finds expression in the simple expedient of encouraging appealsJ the "let 
it go upstairs" attitude. Why? A means of evading loss of authority or 
prestige at times, a means of evading disagreeable finality of decision in 
some instances or the avoidance of various irritating pressures. This at-
titude must not be confused, however, with that of the very conscientious 
judge, clerk or probation officer who is scrupulously fair and explicit in 
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'I explaining to children and parents the statutory rights of appeal and who 
thus tends to increase the appeal ratio by scrupulosity. The converse 
side of this situation reveals the arbitrary, tyrannical officials who slur 
over this extremely important right. 
This completes the present inquiry into the causes of appeal, from 
which it may be concluded that the following factors, singly or in combi na-
tion, contribute heavily toward arriving at the decision to appeal, namely, I 
fear, general or specific; hostility to authority; refusal to face reality; 
dependency reactions; adult influences; legal counsel; the reputation of thj l 
higher court for relative leniency; personal ego satisfaction; the power of 
suggestion or example; the refusal to make financial amends; the poor repu-
tation of training schools; lack of understanding by parents endchildren; 
rational, honest refusals to accept decisions of lower courts; mere unrea- !1 
soning refusal to accept any decision but one's own, and, finally, the work 
ing attitudes of some of the law enforcement personnel. 
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CRAP.rER VI .I 
FIFTY CASES EX.AJIINED 
This group of fifty cases, originating in 1938-1950, inclusive, one 
of the principal concerns of this thesis, is composed of forty-eight cases 
from the files of a Suffolk County municipal court, in its juvenile depart-
ment, supplemented by two cases from the tiles of the Boston Juvenile Court, 
as explained on Page 7, supra. 
Each case was examined in the categories set forth in Figure II, a 
copy of which is filed in the Appendix. 
Once again, one faces the practical problem of presentation and the 
necessity of conforming to a standard size; the matter will be compromised 
by the use of both text and illustrative tables. II 
How old were the boys at the time of appeal? Were their appearances 
in court, on the occasions of their appeals, new experiences? 
TABLE II TABLE III 
.AGES OF BOYS AT TIME OF APPEAL COURT EXPERIENCE 
Age No.Boys Per Cent Arrest llo.Boys Per Cent 
1 1 2.0 lOth 1 2.0 
12 2 4.0 9th 1 2.0 
13 s 6.0 8th 3 6.0 
14 6 12.0 7th 1 2.0 
16 17 34.0 6th 2 4.0 
16 21 42.0 5th 2 4.0 
4th 11 22.0 
Total 50 100.0 Srd 3 6.0 
2nd 9 18.0 
1st 17 34.0 
Total 3.2&: 60 100.0 
a This figure represents the average number of arrests for group. 
II 
I 
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The number tor :first offenders, in Table III, is higher than one 
would ordinarily expect but it consists mainly o£ boys whose parents, in 
most oases, oame to the courthouse determined to appeal unless the boys re-
ceived verdicts that were to their liking) these are usually the people who 
"know" some one "in town." The group average, as noted, was 3.2 experi- I 
ences .for each appellant, a decrease :from the :figure tor 1925-1938, as will 
later be seen. 
What kind o£ homes did the boys come .from? How shall such homes be 
graded? For present purposes, "good" will mean responsible parents, laok 
ot court records o£ such parents or possibly trivial records, well .furnish-
ed and olean living acoomodations, situational understanding or adequate 
orientation, social identification with the com:nunity, conformists with in-
sight, giving good example and having good standards. "Medium" will mean 
:fairly responsible, possibly with records, sufficiently olean and well fur- II 
nished homes, normal understanding, tairlywellidentified socially, reasonj 
ably conforming, with some insight, :fair example and reasonable standards. I 
"Poor" will mean partially irresponsible, usually w.t th records, often seri-
ous records, uiltidy homes, poor furnishings, dull mentalities, poor social 
identification but not anti-social, poor conformists, poor insight and ex-
ample and low standards. "Bad11 will mean totally irresponsible parents, 
I! with court records, usually serious ones, dirty, scantily :furnished homes, 
of obviously low intelligence, anti-social, little or no insight, bad ex-
ample and no standards. Of the homes oonoerned, none seemed to be excel-
lent; two seemed to be good; nine seemed to be medium; thirty-seven seemed 
to be poor; two seemed to be bad. 
ion, it must be emphasized. The 
These evaluations are matters of opin- j 
neighborhoods were mostly medium, follows 
by poor, with only a ftSW truly good or bad. It must be remembered, also, 
that jurisdiction is determined by the place of the commission of the ot-
fence~ so these homes were scattered all over Metropolitan Boston. 
Forty-three of the fifty fathers had court records or 86.0 per cent 
and that is particularly significant bec8l1Se previous annual reports in the 
same District have produced the same general average. Twenty per cent ot 
the mothers had known records~ 66.0 per cent did not have records and 14.0 
per cent were not known; this compares favorably with the usual experience 
here. Only 58.0 per cent of the siblings were checked and 36.0 per cent 
were found to have records and 22.0 per cent had none. 
All fifty of the boys professed some religious faith. 
Forty-two boys~ or 84.0 per cent, repeated at least one grade during 
their school careers; eight boys, or 16.0 per cent, had not been so retard 
ed to time of inquiry. Seventy-six per cent of the boys were members or 
former members of some youth organization, 16.0 per cent were not and 8.0 
pe~ cent were not classified in this category. The families of 80.0 per 
cent of these boys were known to the Social Service Index; the other 20.0 
per cent were not checked in this particular area; almost all were known to 
public and private agencies at some previous time, especially during the 
economic depression years of the 1930's. Local summaries and reports have 
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made this pattern monotonously familiar for the past decade and more. 11 
Of the native intelligence of the fifty boya, ten were not definite-
ly estimated; as a matter of fact, seven of the last ten boys in this se-
ries were not so checked because the court no longer has psychometric ser-
vice available and must now depend upon the school ratings, as furnished 
by the mandatory school reports. Of the 80.0 per cent who were so tested~ 
none were superior; 10.0 per cent were high normal; 42.0 per cent were nor-
'I I 
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11 mal; 16.0 per cent were dull; 10.0 per cent were of borderline intelligence; 
2.0, one boy, was a moron. The boys who · appeal, the ref ore , e.re re a.s onably 
well endowed with native intalligenoe, only six of the forty boys being oon1 
sidered actually deficient. It will undoubtedly be noticed that the poor 
school performance cannot be explained in ter.ms of intelligence alone. 
What were the offences that brought the boys before the court? 
TABLE IV 
DELINQUENCY CHARGES 
Offence Number Boys Per Cent 
Using automobile without authority 16 32.0 
Assault and battery - all kinds 9 18.0 
Breaking cJ: entering &: larceny -night 5 10.0 
Breaking &: entering &: larceny -day 4 a.o 
Larceny 3 6.0 
Malicious destruction property 3 6.0 
Runaway 2 4.0 
Drunkenness 2 4.0 
Indecent assault 1 2.0 
Lewdness 1 2.0 
Carrying revolver 1 2.0 
Attempted larceny 1 2.0 
Breaking gla.ss 1 2.0 
Truancy 1 2.0 
Total 50 100.0 
As may readily be seen, stolen automobiles and assaults aooounted 
for an even halt of the offences. It might be stated, too, for background 
information, that the stated offences do not always tell the whole story; I, 
for example, the "breaking glass" in the table should really have been a ll 
charge for attempting to intimidate a witness. Why should the police have 
used it? Because it was much easier to substantiate, with the evidence 
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available. In the same way, the offences of "runaway" and "stubborn child" 
often cover very serious delinquencies. II 
What was the usual courtroom procedure? All but one were delinquen-
cy hearings thrwghout, with the one starting as a delinquency hearing, with 
no pleas accepted and no confessions nor admissions permitted unless they II 
were made in court after the judge had instructed the children end their pa-
rents in their rights and privileges; any determination of delinquency was 
an adjudication by the judge alone, after full and free hearing in which thel 
rules of evidence were not disregarded. In only one case was the delin-
quenoy charge dismissed and straight criminal proceedings commenced and that 
was when a large, strong boy, sixteen years old, attempted to attack the 
judge on the bench. 
Did these boys have attorneys to represent them at their hearings? 
1 Twenty-two boys did have lawyers and twenty-eight did not. 
Parents were present in every instance , having been summoned; the 
court would not proceed without them except in the most unusual circum-
stances, in which case a clergymen or an attorney would be named guardian 
ad litem for the occfUiion; this situation did not, however, arise in the 
appeal cases. The State was represented on forty-one oaoasions by the 
Division of Child Guardianship and in six instances by the Youth Service 
Board; in the other three cases, the Youth Service Board representative 
did not make an appearance. 
In twenty-seven instances the court had the a.clve.ntage and benefit 
of psychiatric consultation and recommendations; in twenty-three cases suoh 
assistance was not readily available or did not seem to be necessary. Ten 
years ago every boy was given this service in this oourt; in the future, it 
,--
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will have to be restricted to custodial examinations unless some replace-
ment facility can be found. At the moment, such services ere available 
only after a child has been committed, not when he first comes into con-
flict with the le:w; a most peculiar arrangement indeed. This situation 
is expected to be remedied in 1951. 
The findings, after hearings and one trial, were forty-nine delin-
quency adjudications and one finding of guilty. There were twenty-five 
appeals from the findings with the remaining twenty-four delinquency ap-
peals end the one criminal appeal from the dispositions or the sentence. 
What were the dispositions? The criminal case carried a sentence 
of six months in the House of Correction; the truancy charge brought an or-
der of commitment to the Middlesex County Training School; the other twenty-
three disposi tiona were orders of commi tmsnt, as follows: thirteen to the 
Industrial School for Boys at Shirley; eight to the Lyman School; two, sine 
January 1, 1949, to the Youth Service Board. In the criminal case, the ap-
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peal had to be from the sentence, not the verdict.1 II 
What were the reasons tor these appeals? Chapter V, supra, attempt1 
ed to furnish a comprehensive answer to this question. 
What became of these cases in the Superior Court? What later be-
cams ot the boys? The next chapter will seek the answer to the first ques· 
tion and the following chapter will investigate the second one. 
What does this chapter tell us of the details of these fifty cases? 
Forty-four of the boys were of ages considered capable of committing 
crimiaal offences in this Commonwealth. Thirty-eight of them were fifteen 
1 Renado vs Lummus, 205 Mass. 155 (1910). 
II 
II 
years of age or older. II 
None of the home backgrounds were considered to be excellent, two 
were good, nine were medium, thirty-seven were poor and two were bad. Al-
most all were known to public and private agencies at some previous time. II II 
II Forty-three of the fifty fathers had court recorda and at least ten 
of the mothers. More often than not, siblings were k:norm to the court. 
All of the boys professed some religious faith. 
Forty-two of the boys had repeated at least one grade in school. 
Most of the boys were members or fo:nner members of some youth organ-
ization. The contrary has been an exception for the past ten years. 
II The native intelligence of forty of the boys had been tested by psy• 
ohomotrists and twenty-six were estimated to be of normal intelligence, 
eight were dull and the other six were deficient. 
Thirty-three of the boys had previous records, from two to ten prior 
court experiences; seventeen boys were first offenders. 
Stolen automobiles and assaults constituted an even half of the of-
fences charged. 
Twenty-two boys had attorneys and twenty-eight did not. 
Parents were present in every instance and the State was represented 
ll The court had the benefit of psychiatric consultation and advice in 
on forty-seven occasions and missed three others. 
twenty-seven instances; ten years ago every boy waa given this service. jl 
The findings end dispositions are analyzed elsewhere in this study. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE FIFTY CASES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 
Now that the fifty boys have reached the Superior Court, how long 
did they wait before they received the attention of' that appellate body, 
remembering that all the while practically all of' these boys remained in 
their own communities? On an average, the f'if'ty oases waited 3.3 months 
each. Table V, on Page 66, infra, sh01t'8 the basis of' this average. 
'What was the procedure in the Superior Court? Did all the boys ha: 
new hearings, or trials as they are known there. Were they "entered, tried 
and determined as appeals" in criminal oases? Was equity a method, means 
or system of' procedural use? 
Table VI, on Page 66, infra, shows clearly that only 26.0 per cent 
were actually tried, while 60.0 per cent were permitted to plead and the 
I' 
I 
I 
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pleas were ~ccepted as offered. Was this equity procedure? No, it was 
criminal procedure but it was "not deemed to be criminal." 1 What does the: , 
mean? An official of' that court assured the investigator that it meant 
privacy of' hearings or trials, privacy of' records, notices to children and 
parents, infonnal methods in most cases and such juvenile practices as dis-
tinguish these matters from plain adult criminal trials. Is the court par 1 
ticular about prescribed forms in these proceedings? ~e are still very 
much f'onn bound," said the same official. 
I' 
1 Sylvester!!. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 244 (1925). 
TABLE V 
INTERVAL OF PENDENCY IN SUPERIOR COURT 
Months Number ot Boys 
.so ~Two weeks) 8 
.75 Three weeks) 3 
1.00 7 
1.50 (Six weeks) 3 
1.76 (Seven weeks) 1 
2.00 8 
3.00 6 
4.00 2 
5.00 3 
6.00 2 
8.oo 2 
10.00 1 
12.00 1 
15.00 1 
20.00 1 
5.00 (Still pending) 1 
3.30 months average 50 
TABLE VI 
PROCEDURE IN SUPERIOR COURT 
Process 
Jury Trials 
Jury Waived Trials 
Pleas ot Delinquency Aocepted 
Pleas ot Nolo Contendere Accepted 
Plea ot Guilty Accepted 
Disposed Ot Without Pleas 
PendingWithout Pleas 
Total 
Without Pleas 
Shirley - another ease 
u.s • .Army 
u.s.Navy 
Dead 
Total 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
Number ot Cases 
2 
11 
26 
3 
1 
4 
3 
50 
13 
30 
7 
50 
Pending 
Five years 2 
Five months 1 
Total 3 
II 
I 
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What of the 60.0 per cent who pleaded in the Superior Court? Despit,
1 
the statutory language of a cause being heard "before said court as if orig 
inally commenced therein" the child is held to a plea made in the lower 
court, although not so held to a finding. In his discretion, however, a 
judge may permit a plea to be withdrawn or changed. The clause quoted,here..l 
with, by the way, was changed in section fifty-six of Chapter 119 by section 
one, Chapter 244 of the Acts of 1943; that section now reads: "All appealed 
juvenile cases in the superior court shall be transferred to this list, and 
shall be tried, unless otherwise disposed of by direct order of the court," 1 
a new restriction on the use of the device of nolle prosequi by the office 
of the district attorney. In aDf oase, sinoe the vast majority of the fif-
ty bays were not parmi tted to plead in the lovte r court, a practice of the 
past ten years here, it must follow that these thirty pleas were made in enc1 
accepted by the higher court end the children were then held to them; in 
other words, they were "copping a plea," as it is vulgarly but commonly 
known, that is, they were shopping for better terms or dispositions. 
Just what did happen to these fi:f'ty cases in the Superior Court inso-
far as findings and dispositions are eonoerned, remembering that halt of II 
them were positive findings in the lower court and the other half were both 
findings and orders of commitment. Table VII, on Page 68, infra, answers 
this major query. For the form of this table, the writer is indebted to 
:Mr.Alper, whose Table 6, in his work cited, served as the model for it.2 
The comparison of dispositions shows, in bold relief, that in only 28.0 per 
cent of the oases did the decisions of the lower and higher courts coincide, 
that is, in ten adjudications of delinquency and in four orders of oommitme~. 
2 Alper, 2.f•ill.•, p.359. 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISONS OF DISPOSITIONS IN THE SUPERIOR AND LaWlER COURTS 
Lower Court Disposition 
Adjudication Commitment 
~ () 
$::1 
Q) 0 Superior Court ::s ~ til 
a' Q) 0 • .-f J E-4 ~ .,.. ... • • • Disposition r-1 :2 0 C) til ~ • • • til ::if IJ:I ~ 
Delinquency 10 
Shirley School 4 
Lyman School 
Middlesex County T.S. 
House of Correction 
Youth Service Board 
Not Delinquent 7 1 
No Finding 6 
Pending 3 
Probation 1 4 
Suspended Sentence 5 2 
On File 2 1 1 
Filed - Already Committed 2 1 
Dismissed 1 
Total 26 13 8 1 l 2 
a Of these ten sustained findings, the eventual dispositions were: five filed; 
two suspended sentences; three probations. 
r= I 
10 a 
4 
8 
5 
3 
5 
7 
4 
3 
1 
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In all fairness it should be stated, however, that the present inves~ 
tigator cannot concur with Mr • .Alper' s interpretation of the data of his Ta-
ll ble 6, because, in the matter of adjudications, a principal point in issue, 
the lower court was not reversed in every instance because delinquency adju~ 
dioations necessarily were made in the probations, the suspended sentences 
and the three commitments clearly shown therein; there must have been coin 1 
cidental findings or adjudications in these cases. If this construction of 
Mr • .Alper were to be followed by the writer, the precise percentage of coin-
cidenoe in our group would drop from 28.0 per cent to 8.0 per cent and that 
does not appear to be reasonable, fair or logical in view of the obvious 
fact that the lower court merely ruled on presence or absence of delinquency' 
in the ten oases noted in our group and the higher court affirmed, or, on 
its own account, made the same ruling or finding. 
Before one draws a basic conclusion from the finding of a mere 28.0 
per cent affirmation in the higher court, it might be wise to examine the 
detail more carefully, not to minimize it but to determine exactly how seri-
ous is this reversal situation. 
One case was dismissed because the boy had died in the meantime; no 
reversal there. Three were filed because the boys had already been commit-
ted; again no reversal. One was filed, a truancy matter, because the boy II 
had passed the compulsory school age, thus removing the cause of action;tbisll 
could not be construed as a reversal. These five decisions could not rea-
sonably be classified as flouting the lower court and so the percentage of 
coincidence, augmented by these five cases, rises from 28.0 to 38.0 per oentJ 
at this point, however, it seems to be definitely fixed. 
What of the thirteen actual trials? Two went to a jury, one of 
I 
tl 
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them being the seven-year old boy noted in the table of ages; both were 
found to be not delinquent, the equivalent of not guilty in adult oases. 
The other eleven were tried before judges, in jury-waived sessions; five 
were found to be delinquent and six not delinquent. How can judges differ 
so? Judges determine their findings on what they see and hear entered in 
evidence before them. They cannot always know if evidence gets stale, lost 
or is poorly prepared, if memories grow dimmer, witnesses get wearied and 
complainants disgusted, to s~ nothing of other possibilities that may in-
tervene in the transit from the lower to the higher bench. Sometimes even 
the defendants lose interest and merely wait for an eventual call, as wit-
ness the two 1945 oases, once called and placed on a list and still pending 
As to the rest of the group, six Shirley co~tments became one pro-
bation and five suspended sentences; six Lyman commitments became four pro-
bations and two suspended sentences; five adjudications were disposed of 
without findings; three were filed for some reasons not evident; all olearl 
reversals of the lower court. It could be said that they were justifiably 
based on different viewpoints, rational casework, changed circumstances or 
differential treatment, all on a conscientious, intelligent level. On the 
other hand, it could be said that they were mere decisions of convenience, 
or based on misinformation, indifference or sympathetic impulses. This 
group, with the three pending, makes our total of fifty cases. 
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Seventeen boys of the fifty were actually placed on probation in the 
higher court, the five probations and seven suspended sentences noted in th,
1 
previous paragraph, with another five from the adjudication group, namely, 
two who appealed findings below pleaded delinquent above and received sus-
pended sentences and three who appealed findings below, were adjudicated 
II 
ll 
-~-
delinquent in higher court., and were placed on probation. 
How many of these boys successfully completed their courses of dis-
ciplined guidance and training? Is there a measure of probation success 
or can it be measured? 
To consider the second question as a necessary preliminary toward esJI 
tablishing a standard of measurement for the first, it might as well be ad-
mitted that, as a practical rule of thumb, mere completion of the probation 
ary period by the subject is generally accepted as successful practice, in 
an immediate sense, and freedom from arrest for a reason able period there- I. 
after is recognized as conclusive proof of the efficacy of the process. Not~ , 
that the criterion is mere avoidance or absence of arrest, whether deserved 
or not; such an imperfect objective is the basic requirement, almost the 
only requirement, and fn look behind it -- which does not mean that many 
are proud of it. 
The Massachusetts Board of Probation, in its most recent report, 
states: 
One-fifth of the persons whose probation oases were disposed of 
resulted in surrender to the courts as unsatisfactory, and prac-
tically all of them were committed to an institution. Three-
quarters of the probationers completed their probationary peri-
ods satisfactorily. 3 
That states the situation as bluntly and officially as it can be set 
down; it was speaking of the years 1940-1947, inclusive. 
Many officers recognize that such mere completion of probationary 
terms affords "a crude negative measure of probation success" and do not 
permit themselves "to become complacent about the situation" and realize 
"that we cannot measure success by counting up the percentage of failure, 
3 Report of the Board of Probation,l940/7, ~·~· • p.ll. 
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and that mere probation violation rates are therefore of very little use 
for measuring probation success," 4 but, for the present at any rate, it is 
the only official measurement available and it will have to be used as such 
Applying this roughly practical standard to the seventeen cases, we 
find that twelve of them successfully completed their probationary require-
mente and their cases were closed by filing, while five were surrendered as 
unsatisfactory. Of the five failures, four were committed, one to the De-
partment of Public Welfare, one to Lyman, two to Shirley, while the fi.fth 
was filed because the boy, then over the juvenile age, went to a looal 
House of Correction from another court. In terms of percentage, if it wer~ 
not for the fifth boy just mentioned, the ratio of success would have been 
75.0 per cent, exactly as it stood for the State at large for an eight-year 
period, as noted heretofore. As it was, it averaged 71.0 per cent and so 
must be considered a successful performance. 
Of the twelve boys who seemed to have profited by the probationary 
II 
opportunity, seven have since been arrested again; one with thirty-five a- 1 
,I dul t charges but five with only one charge each, minor in each instanoe; 
five have not been arrested since. Practically, if not statistically speak 
ing, all have done well but one. On the other hand, of the five who fail-
ed on probation, one has not been arrested again; the other four have been 
picked up thirty-seven, fourteen, eight and four times. 
Cooperative effort, in a cordial relationship, immeasurably counter-
acts the harmful potentialities of the divided authority between the higher 
and the lower courts. A f#!JW changes in individuals on either or both sides j 
of the dual court mechanism could wreck the delicate balance and bring un- 1 
pleasant and unhealthy consequences, contrary to the best interests of the 
4 Bennett Mead, ..!!, There ! Measure g£_ Probation Success? ,pp.l30 ff. 
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=-t community which expects and trusts each court, each on its own level, to do 
its job. 
To summarize this chapter, one inquires again: "What has the Superi-
or Court done with the fifty boys?" 
Af'ter an interval of from two weeks to twenty months, an average of 
3.3 months, some action was taken. Only 26.0 per cent were actually tried 
I' 
II 
with 60.0 per cent being per.mitted to plead, that is, to avoid trials, all I 
I 
in a manner typical of criminal procedure. .1 
In only 28.0 per cent of the cases did the decisions coincide with I i 
those of the lower court, although examination of detail parmi tted an up-
ward adjustment to 38.0 per cent; in other words, in 62.0 per cent the 
lower court decisions were ignored. 
In the area of co~tments the impotency of the lower courts is 
startlingly revealed. Of twenty-five canmitments, only four were sustained 
by the higher court and three of the four were parolees, that is, boys al-
ready committed for their majorities. 
In the area of adjudication appeals the results were not much better 
because the apparent 40,0 per cent affirmations were not followed ~ any acr 
tion stronger than probation. i 
The lower court decisions are valid only for those who choose to ac-
cept them, an expensive luxury for the community. 
Of the thirteen boys actually tried, there were eight reversals and 
five confirmations. 
Seventeen boys of the fifty were placed on probaticn and twelve 
could be counted as successful, essentially the present State average, 
although the standard of measurement is admittedly very loose and negative. 
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Cooperative efficiency between the two court levels is often a pre- II 
carious thing, more often than not dependent upon the personalities and at-
titudes of the officials involved. 
Does the present method of handling appeals adversely influence the 
methods, standards and achievements of the lower courts? 
what has been learned here, it cannot fail to do so. 
On the basis of 
Does the present method of handling appeals offer adequate treatment 
to individual offenders? It would seem not, when thirty-three appellants 
out of a group of fifty never reach the area of treatment, that is, super-
vised guidance and discipline; those who do are not segregated from adult 
criminal probationers, an anachronistic spectacle in 1951. 
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confined in correctional institutions, that is, two in the Reformatory, 
two with the Youth Service Board and one in a House of Correction. The 
rest of those in the community, within observational range, are getting 
along reasonably well, most of the older ones are working, several are 
married; a few of the older ones, however, are already alcoholics, still 
incapable of self-discipline and already defeated by the trials of life. 
The investigator felt that the number of fairly recent appeal cases 
beclouded the true answer to the principal query of this chapter, particu-
larly as the totals discovered cannot possibly decrease in the future where-
as every reasonable factor points to an increase in subsequent records as 
time goes on. To offer a basis of comparison, to discover a more authori-
tative answer and to establish a broader, more valid, basis, the writer 
thereupon examined eighty-five additional cases from the files of the same 
Suffolk Court, covering the years 1925 to early 1938, as explained on Page 
9 of this study. 
This collateral investigation, the details of which are set out in 
Table IX, copy in Appendix, revealed that of the eighty-five appeal cases 
only seventy-three individual boys were involved, as six boys had appealed 
twice and three boys had appealed three times . This group, incidentally, 
had an average of 3.9 in the category of court experience, as contrasted 
with the 3.2 of the principal class of fifty cases. Strangely enough, all 
of these appeals appear to have been from the dispositions alone, none from 
the findings. 
There was insufficient data to fol1ow up five of these seventy-three 
individual boys, so, deducting these five, there remained sixty-eight in-
dividual boys to be examined for subsequent experiences. The five so elim-
II 
I 
)I 
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inated were included in the total number or appeals and as rirst orrenders 
because they were clearly or that status in any case. 
Sixty-six or the sixty-eight boys were eventually arrested again, 
either as juveniles or adults, ror the staggering ratio or 97.0 per cent. 
Forty of the boys had subsequent juvenile records, or 58.8 per cent, 
while sixty-four had subsequent adult criminal records, or 94.1 per cent. 
Thirty-eight boys had both juvenile and criminal records in later years, or 
55.9 per cent. 
Of the subsequent adult criminal records, twenty-nine were serious 
or relonies; ten were long records but practically all misdemeanors, of 
which drunkenness was an outstanding element; the other twenty-nine were 
minor misdemeanors, of which drunkenness again was a major offence, with 
three mere trafric violations. 
How many of this group of sixty-eight individuals were subsequently 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
committed'? Forty-eight or them, or 70.6 per cent. .An even half' of the 11 
forty-eight eventually reached the State Prison or the Reformatory, rourteeJ 
to the former and ten to the latter. The remaining half were distributed 
three to the State Farm, fourteen to Houses or Correction, five to Shirley I II 
one to Lyman and one to the Middlesex County Training School. Here again, 
the msrger of the lesser into the greater obscured the fact that actually 
twenty-four of the forty-eigllt, again an even half, rinally reached the ju-
venile trainiDg schools, that is, sixteen commitments to Shirley, seven to 
Lyman end three to Middlesex, or twenty-six commitments but, as one was at 
both Shirley and Lyman and another at Shirley and Middlesex, there were 
really only twenty-four boys. 
To conclude this chapter, one repeats '~at were the subsequent re-
I 
I 
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cords of the appellants?" and the data reveals that most of these boys, 
given sufficient time, tend to continue their selfish preoccupations with 
their own needs, despite repeated unhappy experiences resulting from con-
flicts with the law and, at that, this data only focuses upon the occasions 
on which they were caught. 
Sixty-two per cent of the boys in the 1938-1950 group have already 
been arrested again and 38.0 per cent of them have since been committed, 
including 18.0 per cent in the Reformatory. Time is certain to increase 
these ratios, as, indeed, they have been increasing while this thesis has 
been in preparation. Seventy-six per cent of the first half of this 
group, 1938-1945, have subsequent records to date and 40.0 per cent of them 
have been coJllnitted, including 24.0 per cent in the Reformatory. 
Ninety-seven per cent of the 1925-1938 group have been arrested 
again to this time, with a commitment ratio of 70.6 per cent, based on the 
number of individual boys. An even halt of these commitments were to the 
State Prison or to the Reformatory, or 35.3 per cent of the total number of 
boys in the group. 
Does the present method of handling appeals, which in 1951 is sub-
stantia1ly the s~e as it was in 1925, best serve the community? On the 
basis of the results revealed herein, it would seem that it definitely does 
not do so. 
I; 
I 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
Daily practice in the lower courts 1 the District Court of Kassachu-
setts, frequently raises the perennial question of whether our present meth 
od of handling appeals of juvenile offenders to the Superior Court of Mass-
achusetts is the best thing for the child and the community. 
It has appeared that there is only one specialized juvenile court in 
Massachusetts to this day, although the quality of the work in the juvenile 
sections of the district courts has shown consistent improvement, under the 
leadership of the Adndnistrative Committee of the District Courts. 
It is still true, however, that trained~ professional staffs are 
still lackiDg in all the lower courts, including the Boston Juvenile Court, 
and all depend upon the employees to use such skill and knowledge as they 
may acquire on the job. This is also true of the Superior Court, where tJ 
handling of juvenile matters is frankly a casual, occasional function. Only 
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the Boston Juvenile Court has a specialized teaching or training program, 11 
the true function of probation work, and that activity is supported by pri-
11 
vate, not State, funds. It is also evident that the judges, who are the 
final directors of court activities, are not expected to bring any profes-
sional social training or aptitude to their jobs, merely their legal educa.- 1 
tion as members of the Bar. 
There is much historical misinformation still current as to the na-
ture and history of appeals in the English-speaking world. It seems abun-
dantly clear that :Massachusetts, which differs in many fundamental concepts 
from other jurisdictions 1 has inextricably tied its juvenile practice and 
procedure into its Constitutional requirement for trials by jury; appeals 
from lower courts are a pre-requisite to the exercise of that right. It 
would appear, turther, that nothing short of a Constitutional amendment can 
change this situatian, •although legal theoreticians do not completely agree 
about it. At the moment, the once lively issue of juvenile appeals seems 
to be quiescent. 
It appears to be generally believed, since the finding of the Speci 
Commission of 1940, that appeals are infrequent, in any case, but when the 
total number of appeals is contrasted with the total number of commitments 
there emerges the shocking revelation that the authority and judgment of thel1 
lower courts is acceptable only when it happens to please the child, family 
or attorney. The device of suspended orders of commitment is used by most 
of the lower courts to meet this situation. 
Within the past year, thirty personal interviews with former appel-
lants, or with their parents, revealed that in only three instances was 
there an expression of a rational retusal to accept the decision of the 
lower court, a sincere disagreement with the adjudication, and, even here, 
it was parents, not the boys themselves, who offered the reasons. 
The causes of appeals, as theyappeared in these interviews, covered 
a wide range of motivations, often interlocking, which included fears, hos-
tility to authority, retusa.l to face reality, dependency factors, adult in-
fluences, legal maneuvers, reputation of higher court for leniency, ego sat-
isf'action, power of' example, retusal to make financial amends, poor reputa-
tion of training schools, simple lack of understanding, refusal to accept 
any decision that did not please, and the working attitudes of some of the 
law enforcement personnel. 
The fifty boys of the principal group were the sons of fifty fathers 
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who, themselves, had court records in forty-three instances. None of the 
home backgrounds seemed excellexrli, two were good, nine were medium, thirty-
seven were poor and two were bad. .All of the boys, of' whom thirty-eight 11 
were at least fifteen years of age, professed some religious· faith and were, 
or had been, in most instances, members of soma youth organization. .Al-
though only six boys were intellectually deficient, as determined by psy-
cho.metric tests, forty-two of the group of fifty had repeated at least one 
grade in school. li 
Thirty-three of the boys had had previous court experience, with an 
average of 3.2 arrests for the group. Stolen automobiles and assaults mad ' 
up an even halt of the offences charged. 
The available facilities for professional advice and consultation 
are poorer today, in the particular court principally considered, than they 
were ten years ago because the Legislature repealed some helpful laws and II 
tailed to enact others to replace them, that is, those that provided ready 
access to physical, mental and psychiatric examinations. At the moment, t~ 
emphasis on study and examinations is at the end, not at the beginning, of 
the juvenile process, that is, at commitment and not when first arrested or 
soon after. II 
When the appellants reached the Superior Court they had to wait fro.m 
two weeks to twenty months for a hearing, an average of 3.3 months :for the 
group. In only 28.0 per cent of the cases did the decisions coincide with 
those o:f the lower court, although a practical adjujtment, for reasons 
shown, pennitted a final figure o:f 38.0 per cent; in other -words, in 62.0 
per cent the lower court decisions were ignored. Only four out of twenty-
five commitments were sustained and three of those boys were parolees. Ten 
of twenty-five adjudications were at:firmed, with nothing more serious than 
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probation as a consequence in any case. 
Seventeen boys, of the group of fifty, were placed on probation in 
the Superior Court, with a success ratio of 71.0 per cent, as contrasted 
with the current State average of 75.0 per cent. The standard of measure-
ment of probation success is a very loose and negative thing, in both lower 
and higher courts. 
Most of the appellants studied tended to repeat their delinquencies 
or quickly gravitate to crime. Sixty-two per cent of the fifty boys have 
already been arrested again and 38 .o per cent of them have been oommi tted, II 
with an even higher rate for the first half of the group. The passage of 
time will inevitably increase these ratios, as is startlingly suggested by 
the subsequent records of eighty-five case boys, appellants during 1925- II 
1938, in the same district. The sixty-eight individuals of this collatera 
group, whose subsequent records were checked, reached the astounding ratio 
of 97.0 per cent re-arrested later, with more than 70.0 per cent committed 
to date, and time is still running on them. I 
Does the present method of handling appeals adversely influence meth I 
ods, standards and achievements of the lower courts? On the basis of what 
happened to these fifty cases in the higher court, it cannot fail to do so. 
The lower court decisions are valid only for those who choose to accept 
them; an expensive luxury for the comrmmity. 
Does the present method of handling appeals offer adequate treatment 
to the individual offenders? It would not seem so, when only seventeen ap 1 
pellants out of fifty reach the area of possible treatment. Those who are I 
subjected to the probationary process, a teaching process, seem to do as 
well in the Superior Court as others do elsewhere. Adult and juvenile 
'I 
j, 
probationers, however, are still the concern of the sairB officer, the divi- 11 
sion of work being geographically determined, despite the statutory injunc-
tion to separate juvenile matters from the main adult stream. 11 
Does the present method of handling appeals best serve the communityf, 
On the basis of the results revealed in the examination of subsequent re-
cords, it would seem that it definitely does not do so. There are no sta-
tistics to indicate how many, and to what extent, innocent victims suffered 
from the selfish, sometimes dangerous, depredations of these groups, al-
though the high incidence of subsequent felony commitments would suggest 
that it was not an unimportant factor in their activities; in too many 
cases, these boys later became plain out-lmws, preying on a long-suffering 
o onnnuni ty. 
As so often happens in this field, no one is particularly interested 
until some outrageous incident involves these boys in a public scandal and 
danger, whereupon the whole subject beoanes front pege and editorial matter 
with a clamor for scape-goats, usually officials, and demands for immediate 
I 
radical and, often, unsound changes. 
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CHAPTER X 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
il It seems clear, from the foregoing material, that the present Mass- 1 
achusetts system of handling juvenile appeals does not adequately serve the 
community or the delinquent boys. It appears to be of value only to those ii 
who, experienced in delinquency or unreasonably hostile to e:ny forum that II 
can be circumvented, oan be dealt with only by a final and superior author-
ity. It is also clear that this delaying, nullifying, capricious choice 
of forums is made possible because of the Constitutional right which is 
based on the guarantee of a trial by jury, a device established by the rev-
olutionary forefathers in days when judges were not even lawyers. 
How can this situation be corrected? Obviously, by providing such 
a final, superior authority, without sacrificing the right of jury trial. 
The basic principles of our juvenile code, the care, protection, non~ 
criminal and disciplinary provisions of that code, are as valid now as when 
originally laid down, possibly improved by subsequent amendments. What 
then can be wrong today? Simply stated, it is that there has been a fail-
ure, to date, to provide the specialized mechanism to carry out its provi-
sions and principles, with the exception of the Boston Juvenile Court, and 
there has grown up a patch-work synthesis of juvenile and criminal prooe-
dures and attitudes, in both the lower and higher courts; a clean break 
with the past was never made in the first instance. The appeal system, 
characteristic of adult procedure, has served to further complicate and 
entangle the dualistic pattern. 
Although eminent authority deprecates the seriousness of the situa-
ll 
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tion today, it has been revealed that, in its most grave and important 
phase, the power of local courts to protect their communities by the exer-
cise of ultimate authority, has been substantially defeated and by those 
who have established themselves as repeated offenders. Of course, the low-
er courts have worked out a practical technique in meeting this situation, 
the use of suspended sentences, but even that is not always conclusive, as 
has been seen. 
It must also have been noticed that in Suffolk County today there are 
ten different courts, one superior, one juvenile and eight municipal or dis-
trict courts, all dealing, sometimes at cross-purposes, with the same prob-
lem. 
With the foregoing, familiar facts in mind, what possible recommenda-
tion could suggest itself? The answer would clearly seem to be a county 
juvenile court, of original, superior and final jurisdiction, with judges 
and probation officers equally trained, the former in law and social work 
and the latter in social work, at least. Such a court of established co~ 
petence and specialized training, capable of planning and carrying through 
adequate teaching programs, could command and hold the respect of the co~ 
munity. A written transcript of the proceedings wanld guarantee sufficient 
material upon which to base a complete, judicial review. 
What of the all-important right of appeal? Where does it fit into 
this proposition? The plan of the Judicial Council, stated in 1943, offer-
ed a system analagous to that used for the civil side of the lower courts 
since 1922 1 and is undoubtedly constitutional so long as, but only so long 
as, the defendant chooses, by submission to the tribunal, to waive his righ 
1 Judicial Counoi 1, 'N'ineteenth Report, 2E.·~·, p.31. 
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of appeal. It was essentially a suggestion for the use of the lower, or in-
ferior, courts. The older plan, of Justice Lummus,2 is the one that has 
suggested itself to the present investigator, namely, an appeal fra.m the ad-
judication only, with a return of the matter for disposition by the original ! 
juvenile benoh; this would also seem to be saf'ely within oonsti tutional lim-
itations. Another possibility would be a selection of procedure by the de-
fendant, at the very beginning of the judicial process, and at that time 
alone, wherein he would demand or waive his jury trial; if waived, the court 
would proceed forthwith; if claimed, the cause would be sent to a jury for 
adjudication and, if the finding were positive, retained for disposition; 
this also would seem to be clea:dly constitutional and it is, essentially, 
one of the ideas expressed in 1943 by the Judicial Council, except that the 
whole proceeding would be on a superior, not superior and district, level. 
There is also the possibility, of course, of creating, by statute, 
a juvenile department of the Superior Court but that would seem to be no 
more than an additional patch upon the already well-patched structure; fur-
ther such an innovation could be made at any time without additional legis-
lation. Any such developmem, however, would be no more than an essential 
evasion of the real problem. 
There remains another al~ernative, the truly bold possibility of a 
constitutional challenge of our present system, similar to the issue decided 
in Fisher vs Commonwealth, which was previously noted, but, first, statutory 
changes would be necessary in order to focus the issue. Even so, the con-
trary view, so cogently expressed in other oases, 3 might prevail. 
2 Lummus, ~·~·, P• 29. 
3 People!! Lewis, 260 New York 171 (1932). 
87 
II 
II 
II 
Would no appeal be offered, at all, from the proposed superior juve-
nile court? Would there be no eheok against harsh and arbitrary disposi-
tiona? Yes, indeed; that remedy is already clearly forecast by the Acts 
o£ 1943, Chapter 558, whioh created a panel of three judges within the Su- 11 
4 pericr Court, itself, to review the sentences of its own court. That par-
ticular statute provided only for reconsideration of State Prison and Wo~ I' 
en's Reformatory sentences of five years or more but the principle is ready 
to hand and could be utilized in juvenile procedure. If the proposed cou"j
1 
is of superior jurisdiction, a statutory extension of this existing princi- II 
ple would give the necessary Check against the personal opinions, whims, cal 
prices, prejudices or fears of the juvenile judges sitting in superior sta-
tus. There would also exist, as now provided, appeals on matters of law 
only to the Supreme Judicial Court, as was noted in the chapter on court . 
history, Page 21, supra. 
Is there any practical possibility of securing Legislative approval 
and authority to set up such a proposed court? Probably not; too many 
vested interests would oppose it violently. It should never be forgotten, 
however, that constant educative effort does have a cumulative effect, as 
witness the many amendments since 1906. Further, the gentlemen of the Leg-
islature, like many others, are not impervious to reasonable propositions 
and, too often, are blamed by those who have failed to adequately present 
their proposals to them. Like other persons, too, they may justifiably 
resent tailor-made plans handed to them for mere enactment, as though they 
were incapable of working out their own ideas. The most reasonable manner 
4 Judicial Council, Twenty-second Report, 1946, p.lOO. 
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in which to present such a far-reaching change, although really no more than 
a return to original, fundamental principles, would seem to be through the 
mechanics of committee hearings, with full and free discussim available to 
all interested. 
II If such a proposition should be rejected, in whole or in part, it 
might be some consolation to consider the present, inadequate system as a 
part of the price that must be paid to retain our infinitely greater demo-
cratic heritage of concern for the protection of the individual, even though ' 
as here, it is sincerely believed that that principle is being abused in the 
problemwhich has been considered. 
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TABLE VIII 
FIFTY JUVENILE CASES 
1938-1950 
A SUFFOLK COURT 
Number Year Arrest Se uel 
1 1938 1 1 Working; last arrest 1947. 
2 It 7 No record since; married;school. 
3 1939 10 9 M.R.;last arrest 1949. 
4 1940 3 3 34 M.R.;H.C.;last 1950;alooholic. 
:I 5 1941 6 35 H.C.;last 1950;works;drinks. 
6 tt 1 1 12 Last 1950;works;drinks. 
7 1942 8 3 2 M.R.;last 1950;doing poorly. 
8 1943 4 1 3 Shirley; last 1949. 
9 " 1 3 H. C.; last 1950. 
10 It 1 No record; still juvenile. 
11 n 2 1 1 Shirley; last 1948;works. 
12 1944 8 5 3 M.R.twice;there now.l950. 
13 It 4 2 M.R.;last 1949; now H.C. 
14 " 2 1 Traffic record only; works. 
15 1945 9 M.R.;last 1945; works. 
16 It 5 No reoord since. 
17 " 1 1 Last 1947; now u.s.Navy. -
18 tt 4 2 5 Last 1950; now Grand Jury.case. 
19 tt 4 2 1 Last 1948; now u.s.Ar~. 
20 It 4 No record since; now u.s.Army. 
21 tt 4 1 Last 1950; drinks; works. 
22 It 1 No record since; now U.S.Ar.my. 
23 It 1 1 Last 1946; now u.s.Army. 
24 tt 3 1 13 Last 1949; now married; works. 
25 " 5 3 Last 1950; ex-U.S.Navy; works. I 26 tt 2 2 1 Last 1949; works; school. 
27 1946 4 Shirley;last 1946;now U.S.Army. I 28 1945 1 Shirley;prob.surr.Superior Ct. 
29 1946 1 2 Last 1947; now u.s.Ar~. 
30 " 1 No record since; working. 31 tt 4 1 M.R.;now H.C.l950. 
32 tt 8 7 M.R.;last 1948;works. 
33 n 4 No record since; now U.S.Navy. 
34 " 4 4 Lyman;now YSB;still juvenile. 35 It 1 No record since;now u.s.Ar.my. 
36 1947 1 No record since;now u.s.Ar.my. 
37 n 3 No record since;no news. 
38 n 4 3 YSB 1950; still juvenile. 
39 n 2 1 Last 1~48; no news. . 
40 " 2 1 Last 1949; no news. 
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TABLE VIII {continued) 
41 1949 2 1 1 YSB 1950; now other State. 
42 " 1 Still juvenile. 
43 It 1 Still juvenile. 
44 " 2 1 YSB 1949; just turned adult. 
45 n 2 Killed resisting arrest, 1949. 
46 1950 1 Sti 11 juvenile • 
47 tt 1 1 Still juvenile;now U.S.Army. 
48 n 2 Still juvenile. 
49 II 1 Sti 11 juvenile. 
50 1947 6 1 1 L ;Shirle ;M.R.l949. 
Totals 160 34 144 
Note: 
All fifty were both case boys and individual boys. 
M.R. is Massachusetts Reformatory. 
H.C. is House of Correction. 
Shirley is Industrial School for Boys. 
Lyman is Lyman School. 
Y.S.B. is Youth Servioe Board. 
U.S.A. is United States Army. 
U.S.N. is United States Navy. 
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TABLE IX 
EIGHTY-FIVE JUVENILE CASES 
1925-1938 
A SUFFOLK COURT 
Subsequent Arrests 
II 
II 
Number Year Arrest Juvenile Adult Sequel 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
1925 
tt 
tt 
It 
ri 
It 
tt 
" 
tt 
" tt 
tt 
n 
It 
n 
tt 
It 
It 
1926 
" It 
1928 
n 
" 
n 
n 
It 
tt 
It 
1930 
" n 
tt 
n 
" 
It 
tt 
1931 
n 
" tt 
8 
6 
6 
6 
1 
4 
3 
6 
6 
4 
6 
7 
2 
4 
8 
3 
3 
1 
9 
3 
6 
6 
1 
7 
6 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
4 
4 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
7 
3 
6 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
7 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 No record sinoe 1940. 
Serious M.R.1938. 
Also No.2. 
Serious Shirley;S.F.;H.C.;last 1951. 
Card missing. 
Serious M.R.l926 and 1936. 
1 Last 1926. 
Serious H.C.; M.R.; S.P. 
Serious S.P.; last 1945. 
1 Last 1926. 
Long Shirley 1926; adult misdemeanors. 
Also No.ll. 
2 Last 1929. 
Serious M.R.1934. 
None 
Also No.l1 and No.l2. 
Also No.l3. 
M.C.T.S.; no adult record. 
Card missing. 
Also No.1. 
Serious Lyman; S.P.; last 1942. 
Serious S.P.l943. •I 
Long H.C.; adult misdemeanors. I 
Serious M.R. (Juvenile paternity case). 1 
Serious H.C.; M.R.l943. 
Serious ll.R. 
Serious S.P.;last 1950. (14 juv.charges). 
Long 
Long 
Data not available. 
Died in H.C.l936. 
H.C.; adult misdemeanors. 
Appealed $5 rine;no record since. 
6 H.C.; last 1942. 
Serious Shirley; M.R.;last 1946. 
1 Lyman 1930; adult traffic only. 
Long Adult drunkenness record only. 
Serious H.C.;K.R.;S.P.;now alcoholic. 
Serious Lyman; S.P. 
None No adult record. 
Long M.C.T.S.;Shirley;H.C. 
4 Shirley; H.C.; last 1946. 
Long H.C.; now drunkenness record. 
Serious Lyman; S.P. 
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42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
so 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
61 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
1932 
" It 
It 
" 
" 
n 
" n 
" 
1933 
It 
It 
It 
" It 
It 
It 
It 
" 
It 
It 
It 
It 
" It 
It 
" n 
It 
1934 
" 
" II 
It 
It 
n 
1935 
" 
1937 
It 
" 
" 
1938 
6 
5 
7 
4 
9 
4 
3 
5 
3 
1 
4 
1 
5 
9 
1 
8 
6 
3 
2 
4 
2 
6 
7 
2 
6 
1 
8 
3 
2 
5 
5 
1 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
5 
2 
1 
1 
4 
T.ABLE IX (continued) 
1 Yes 
Long 
Serious 
2 Yes 
2 Serious 
Long 
1 Serious 
1 Yes 
Serious 
6 Long 
1 
1 Serious 
2 
Yes 
1 Serious 
2 
3 Yes 
1 1 
3 Serious 
1 Serious 
2 
1 5 
Yes 
2 Serious 
3 Serious 
Yes 
1 2 
1 Serious 
Serious 
1 Yes 
Serious 
1 
1 
1 Yes 
H. c.; last 1950. 
H.C.; S.F.;alcoho1io;died recently. 
S.P.l940; now missing. 
Short adult drunkenness record. 
Lyman;Shirley;M.R. 
M.C.T.S.;H.C.;last H.C.l950. 
Lyman;H.C.;M.R.;now alcoholic. 
Short adult drunkenness record. 
M.R.;1ast arrest 1943. 
Card missing. 
H.C.; last 1944. 
Last 1934. 
Also No.S2. 
Shirley;H.C.;M.R.;S.P. 
Two drunkenness arrests only. 
Also No.52 and No.54. 
Short adult drunkenness record. 
Shirley; S.P. 
Adult traffic record only. 
Shirley; short adult record. 
Shirley; minimum adult record. 
Lyman; H.c.; now dead. 
Also No.63. 
Shirley; M.R.; S.P. 
Also No.41. 
Minor adult record. 
Also No.63 and No.64. 
Shirley; H.C. 
Adult misdemeanor record. 
Also No.6!. 
M.R.; S.P. 
H.C.; still active record. 
Adult misdemeanor record. 
Shirley; last 1938. 
Also No.73. 
No other record. 
Transient;Ohio;no data available. 
H.C.; last 1942. 
Shirley; H.C.; S.P. 
Last arrest 1950. 
M.R.; S.P.l946. 
Traffic fine only adult record. 
Runaway; last arrest 1942. 
Shirle ; adult drunkenness record. 
Totals 
340 gross 
282 net 74 net - ... 
Note: 
Eighty-five case boys; seventy-three individual boys. 
S.P. is State Prison; S.F. is State Farm; M.C.T.S. is Middlesex County 
!raining Sohool;others identified in Table VIII. 
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FiGURE 2 II 
SCHEDULE OF .ANALYSIS 
Identification Symbol: 
Chapter VI 
/I 
II 
I 
Age: 
Home: 
Church: 
School: 
/I 
Intelligence: 
Lower Court 
Chapter VI I Court Experience: Offence: Procedure: 
/l 
I 
Counsel: 
Parent Present: 
Psychiatric Diagnosis: 
Finding: 
Disposition: 
Reasons For Appeal: Chapter V 
Superior Court 
Interval Of Pendency: 
Procedure: Chapter VII 
Counsel: 
Finding: 
Disposition: 
If Probation, What Result? 
Subsequent Record 
Extent: 
Last Arrest: 
Chapter VIII 
Interval Fran Appeal To Present: 
Last Contact: 
Notes: 
II 
I 
FIGURE 3 
CHAPTER 119, SECTION 53 
Sections fifty-two to sixty-three,inclusive, shall be liberally 
construed so that the care, eustody and discipline of the children 
brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that 
which they should reoei ve from their parents, and that, as far as 
practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children 
in need of aid, encouragement and guidance. Proceedings against 
children under said sections shall not be deemed criminal proceedings. 
CHAPTER 119, SECTION 56 
Hearings upon cases arising under sections fifty-two to sixty-
three, inclusive, may be adjourned from time to time. A child ad-
judged a wayward or delinquent child may appeal to the superior court 
upon adjudication, and also may appeal to said court at the time of 
the order of commitment or sentence, and such child shall, at the 
time of such adjudication and also at the time of such order ot' com-
mitment or sentence, be notified of his right to appeal. If such 
child appeals to the superior crurt at either of said times, said 
court shall thereupon have jurisdiction of such case, and such case 
shall forthwith be entered in said court. The appeal, it' taken, 
shall be tried and determined in like manner as appeals in criminal 
oases, except that the trial of said appeals in the superior court 
shall not be in conjunction with the other business of that court, 
but shall be held in a session set apart and devoted for the time 
baing exclusively to the trial of juvenile cases. This shall be 
knovm as the juvenile session of the superior court, and shall have 
a separate trial list and docket. All appealed juvenile cases in 
the superior court shall be transferred to this list, and shall be 
tried, unless otherwise disposed of by direct order of the court. 
In any appealed case the superior court, before passing sentence or 
before ordering other disposition, shall be supplied with a report 
of any investigation thereon made by the probation officer of the 
court from which the appeal was taken. Section thirty-five of 
chapter two hundred and seventy-six and section eighteen of chap-
ter two hundred and seventy-eight, relative to recognizances in 
eases continued or appealed, shall apply to cases arising under 
sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive. 1943, 244,s.l. 
Note: 
These excerpts are cited from USssaohusetts General Lsws, 
Tercentenary Edition, 1931, as amended. 
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